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Abstract 
False confessions occur at a rate that contradicts the commonsense belief that only the 
guilty confess.  Wrongful conviction statistics show that more than a quarter of people 
exonerated due to retrospective testing of DNA evidence were initially convicted based either 
solely or partly on their false confession to the crime.  This has prompted a large body of 
research, which has contributed to understanding of how and why such false confessions 
occur, resulting in recommendations to reduce their instance.  Recently, researchers have 
begun to investigate why juries accepted these false confessions in the first place, with case 
studies confirming that jurors are prone to accepting confession evidence that, in hindsight, 
should have been rejected.  However, the picture is not entirely bleak, with other empirical 
evidence indicating that jurors will sometimes (albeit rarely) reject confession evidence that 
they view as potentially false.  The basis of the variance in juror decision making on 
confession evidence is the focus of the current series of studies. 
In four chapters, we describe a series of mock-juror experiments investigating how 
jurors process confession evidence, and why they will sometimes accept a problematic, low 
quality confession as true, while at other times will reject the confession.  Using a 
combination of typed confession statements, transcripts of police interview, and police 
summary statements, we aimed to identify the situational factors (confession attributes) that 
influence juror judgments of suspect guilt.  Additionally, using existing scales (Need for 
Cognition, and Attitudes Toward Coerced Confessions) we tested the contribution of 
dispositional factors (juror attributes) in moderating juror decision making. 
We found that the confession attribute of consistency significantly influenced juror 
judgments of suspect guilt, but that this effect differed dependent on the type of inconsistency 
present in the confession (Chapter 2).  Mock-jurors were not concerned about the suspect 
contradicting and then self-correcting their previous statements, but when the suspect made 
 x 
 
  
errors that could be proven factually incorrect with a secondary piece of evidence, judgments 
of suspect guilt were reduced.  This particular finding suggests that jurors might more easily 
rationalize why a suspect might be telling a narrative in a way that requires backtracking and 
correction (e.g. deliberate mistruth, confusion due to intoxication), than why a suspect would 
get key facts of the crime entirely wrong.   
However, further testing revealed that not all factual errors were treated equally 
(Chapter 3).  When factual errors were parsed out into errors that appeared to be amplifying 
or downplaying the crime severity, we found differential effects of directionality on 
judgments of guilt that were not aligned with how we had hypothesized jurors would process 
such inconsistencies.  For example, we believed that if the suspect confessed to a crime 
greater than the facts would imply, participants might infer that he is making himself look 
worse, and wonder why anyone would confess to a greater crime than they actually 
committed, thus discounting the confession.   On the other hand, if the suspect confessed to a 
lesser version of the confirmed crime, he might be seen as attempting to make himself look 
better, or less culpable, which has a clear ulterior motive, and would result in the juror 
upholding the confession.  Contrary to these hypotheses, no discounting was applied to 
confessions where the suspect appeared to be making his case worse by admitting to a more 
severe version of the crime, in comparison to a confession in which the suspect confessed 
fully and without error.  While this finding speaks to the overall believability of confession 
evidence, and that jurors will simply accept any confession as true, results of the better (i.e. 
decreased crime severity) confession provide interesting data for consideration.  When 
factual errors acted to decrease crime severity, (thereby making the suspect look better) 
mock-jurors judged the suspect as more guilty of the crime than the suspect who admitted 
fully and accurately to the crime, effectively adding a punitive cost to perceived downplaying 
of the crime.  Overall, we found that mock-jurors did notice confession inconsistencies, and 
xi 
that some types of inconsistencies, in some circumstances, would influence judgments of 
suspect guilt.  
While chapters 2 and 3 focused on situational factors that might account for the 
variance in juror decision-making when presented with confession evidence, the papers 
described in chapters 4 and 5 were concerned with identifying dispositional factors that might 
interact with confession attributes to influence judgments of suspect guilt, with mixed 
success. 
Need for cognition (NC) has been identified as a possible moderator in juror decision 
making, as it is concerned with inherent levels of motivation to engage in cognitively 
challenging tasks (Chapter 4).  One reason posited for why jurors sometimes accept 
confession evidence that should have been rejected due to poor quality, is that jurors do not 
adequately scrutinize confession evidence, as they implicitly (and logically) believe it to be 
truthfully given.  However, the naturally elevated motivation of high NC jurors should 
translate to an increased likelihood of engaging with the confession evidence more deeply 
and analytically, moderating any effect of confession inconsistencies on judgments of guilt.  
While previous research would generally agree that NC moderates juror decisions in some 
capacity, the current study and other studies using confession stimuli have not found this to 
be true.  Across four experiments, we found no effect of need for cognition (measured on the 
18-question Need for Cognition scale) on judgments of suspect guilt.  We posit a number of
reasons for this null finding, including the possibility that the motivation component of need 
for cognition does not adequately control for engagement levels in a trial where confession 
evidence is present.   
However, while need for cognition failed as a dispositional factor contributing to juror 
variance in our study, we had considerable success with another juror attribute; that of 
attitudes toward coerced confessions (Chapter 5).  Using the previously untested Attitudes 
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Toward Coerced Confessions scale (ATCC) we measured underlying support for coercive 
interrogation tactics and the belief that false confessions can be coerced from an innocent 
person.  Findings showed the ATCC to be a valid measure of its two stated constructs (i.e. 
support for coercive interrogation, and belief in coerced confessions), and was reliably 
replicated in an experiment where coercion was manipulated within the confession.  We 
found that the subscales of the ATCC could accurately predict which participants would, or 
would not, reduce their perception of suspect guilt when inconsistencies or coercion were 
present in the confession. 
In summary, the present series of experiments adds to the literature on juror decision 
making by addressing the mechanisms underpinning the ways in which jurors process 
confession evidence.  Our findings show that while jurors can discern confession 
inconsistencies, recognition of those inconsistencies only result in reduced judgments of guilt 
in certain circumstances.  While need for cognition failed to account for any variance in juror 
decision making, one dispositional attribute that moderated judgments of suspect guilt was 
identified.   The ATCC scale was able to successfully predict which individuals would ignore 
the coercive elements of a confession when deciding if a confession was reflective of true 
guilt, as well as those individuals who would be concerned by the inconsistencies in a 
confession and reduce their judgment of guilt accordingly.   
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1.1 Overview 
False confessions are a counter-intuitive phenomenon: Most people find it difficult to 
imagine a situation in which an innocent person would confess to a crime (Henkel, Coffman, 
& Dailey, 2008; Leo & Liu, 2009). However, false confessions appear with concerning 
frequency in wrongful conviction cases (e.g. Drizin & Leo, 2004), and the belief that they do 
not occur may, paradoxically, contribute to their powerful influence on juror decisions. 
One important issue regarding false confessions is that jurors might be overly 
accepting of confession evidence, and not scrutinize confession evidence in the same way 
that they would other types of evidence such as eyewitness testimony (Malloy & Lamb, 
2010).  Yet, not all evidence points to an unthinking acceptance of confession evidence by 
jurors.  Emerging research suggests that jurors might be more aware of the problems in 
confession evidence than given credit for (Henderson & Levett, 2016; Palmer, Button, 
Barnett, & Brewer, 2016; Woestehoff & Meissner, 2016).  For example, Palmer et al. found a 
reduced propensity to render a guilty verdict when jurors were presented with a factually 
incorrect confession statement. 
The research described in this thesis is concerned with the ways in which the 
presentation of evidence, and individual difference factors contribute to juror processing of 
confession evidence, particularly when that evidence contains inconsistencies that may 
indicate a false confession.  Our first aim is to identify the circumstances under which jurors 
are better able to discern inconsistent testimony. Our second aim is to investigate whether 
juror characteristics moderate the effect of confession attributes on judgments of guilt.  That 
is, can we predict whether the juror will be concerned by inconsistencies in confession 
evidence, rather than simply accepting the confession at face value? 
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1.2 False Confessions 
Since the introduction of DNA testing, more than 350 people have been exonerated 
("Innocence Project," 2017), with retrospectively-tested DNA evidence proving them 
innocent of their convicted crime.  According to Innocence Project statistics, these wrongful 
convictions are predominantly attributed to eyewitness misidentification (approximately 
75%), and false confessions (approximately 27%) (note that percentages do not add to 100% 
because wrongful convictions may have multiple causes).  It is relatively easy to rationalize 
how an eyewitness could identify an innocent person, while being confident that they were 
correct.  People generally understand that memory is fallible, and may well be able to relate 
to the experience of being certain of a particular memory, only to be proven wrong later.  
False confessions are not a phenomena to which people can easily relate: Individuals 
generally have difficulty imagining a situation in which they would falsely confess. This 
problem is compounded by the logical fact that the innocent suspect knows that they are 
innocent, making it hard for an observer to understand why they did not simply hold out, safe 
in the knowledge that there would be no evidence to prove their guilt.  While we are all 
highly likely to have a moment where our certainty in our memory is shaken, we are unlikely 
to ever be in a situation where we falsely confess to murder, and have difficulty imagining 
ourselves in that situation.  It is not surprising, then, that confessions are so readily accepted 
by jurors (e.g. Garrett, 2010), while other types of evidence, such as eyewitness testimony, 
are held to a higher standard (e.g. Malloy & Lamb, 2010; Palmer, Button, Barnett, & Brewer, 
2016). 
The regularity with which false confessions appear in wrongful conviction cases runs 
counter to the idea that people will not act in ways that cause them unnecessary hardship.  
With no apparent benefit to a person falsely confessing to a crime they did not commit, it is 
unsurprising that people in general have difficulty believing that false confessions occur.  
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Yet, the existence of false confessions is partly a testament to our self-serving nature, in that 
an innocent suspect will attempt to make the best out of a bad situation and confess in order 
to cease the interrogation and begin the process of clearing their name.  This is most clearly 
illustrated in the differentiation between different types of false confessions. 
Kassin and Wrightsman (1985) identified three types of confessions, categorised by 
their voluntariness (voluntary vs coerced), and whether the confessor maintains their belief in 
their innocence during the confession (coerced-compliant vs coerced-internalized).  The 
voluntary false confession is where a person simply confesses to a crime without prompting, 
motivated by the delusional belief that they are guilty, or the misguided desire for notoriety.  
The 1947 murder of Black Dahlia actress Elisabeth Short attracted no less than 50 would-be 
confessors, willing to accept the consequences of admitting to such a high-profile murder 
(Kassin, 2008).    The motivation for people who give voluntary confessions is relatively easy 
to understand and detect, with serial confessors appearing each time a new crime hits the 
news–such as Henry Lee Lucas who was said to have falsely confessed to more than 600 
murders (Gudjonsson, 1999).   
Coerced confessions, however, are not as simple to rationalize, or detect.  In the case 
of coerced-internalized confessions, suspects start with the understanding that they are 
innocent, through the pressures of interrogation they come to believe that their memory is 
faulty, that the police are telling the truth, and that they have indeed committed the crime 
(Garrett, 2010; Kassin, 2008; Leo & Drizin, 2010).  Garrett (2010) describes the case of 
William Kelly who became convinced that the police were telling the truth about his role in a 
murder and that he must have blacked out, causing his lack of memory for the crime.  His 
internalization of the guilt led to confabulating details of the crime based on information 
gleaned from police.  Coerced-internalized confessions, such as Kelly’s, are a direct product 
of coercive interrogation techniques designed to elicit confessions using tactics such as false 
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evidence as ‘proof’ of the suspect’s guilt, and unrelenting statements about the surety of the 
suspect’s guilt.  Certain groups of individuals are more susceptible to internalize the guilt of 
the crime under these circumstances, including unrepresented minors, and those with mental 
illness (such as William Kelly), or reduced mental capacity (Kassin, 1997).  Under pressure 
of investigation, the innocent suspect loses sight of their innocence, and may take a period of 
time after confessing to understand that their feelings of guilt were due to coercion rather 
than culpability.  On such case was that of 14-year old Michael Crowe, who was convinced 
by the police that he had murdered his 12-year old sister (Kassin, 2008), despite having no 
motivation to commit, or memory of, the crime.  In adulthood, Crowe voiced the concern 
that, had the real perpetrator not been found, he might well still be convinced that he had 
murdered his sister. 
The same interrogation techniques that result in a misplaced internalized belief of 
guilt can also result in a coerced-compliant confession, where the innocent suspect is brow-
beaten into confessing, while maintaining the knowledge of their innocence.   The use of 
deceptive and coercive interrogation tactics does not result in the suspect internalizing the 
guilt of the crime, but creates a feeling of helplessness that leads to the suspect believing that 
confessing is the only way to start the process of proving their innocence.  An extreme 
example of situational pressures resulting in a coerced-compliant confession is that of Linda 
Stangel, described by Leo and Ofshe (1998).  Accused of pushing her boyfriend from a cliff, 
Stangel was pressured into confessing on the narrow walkway of the clifftop, where the 
police had chosen to conduct the interrogation, knowing that she was terrified of heights.  
Prior to the confession, Stangel had steadfastly maintained her innocence, and afterwards 
stated that her confession was only to stop the interrogation and get off the cliff.  The case of 
Linda Stangel is a reminder that non-violent coercive techniques can be incredibly effective 
in eliciting false confessions, and an illustration of how invisible such coercive tactics would 
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likely be to a jury, who often simply hear the confession, without mention of the surrounding 
circumstances. 
1.3 Interrogation techniques 
One reason why jurors have such difficulty understanding that false confessions can 
and do occur, is that they do not understand the processes of police interrogation, and the 
ways in which police officers are specifically trained in some countries to manipulate 
suspects to elicit confessions.  It should be noted that police interrogations are different to 
police interviews in structure and purpose.  While interviews are a fact-finding exercise, 
interrogations are performed on suspects that the police have determined are guilty of the 
crime, and are used to gain confessions.  Some models of police interviewing do not move 
beyond the information-gathering stage (e.g., the PEACE model), with little distinction in 
questioning style between witness, victim, or suspect.   Other models (e.g., the Reid 
technique) use the interview phase to make a preliminary assessment of likely guilt, based on 
verbal and non-verbal cues.  If the police form the belief that the individual is guilty, the 
interactions move from information-gathering to extracting a confession, via nine prescribed 
interrogation techniques.  The initial concern with the post-interview process outlined in the 
Reid technique, is that by viewing the suspect through the lens of certain guilt, all responses, 
denials, and behavior are attributed to a guilty person who does not want to admit their guilt 
(Leo & Drizin, 2010).  Assumed guilt then pre-disposes police to reject the possibility that 
the denials are that of an innocent person who they have incorrectly categorised as guilty.   
Another concern of guilt-presumptive interrogations is that the only acceptable 
outcome is a confession, and the interrogating officer is able to use any legal means at their 
disposal to achieve this.  Although the ‘third degree’ (i.e., threat of, and actual physical harm) 
is no longer permitted to gain a confession, the range of permissible, non-physical, coercive 
interrogation techniques allow levels of psychological torture to achieve the same end: a 
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confession (Ofshe & Leo, 1997).  Coercive interrogation techniques start from a foundation 
of suspect vulnerability, isolating them both physically and from their legal support 
mechanisms (i.e., a defence attorney), and subjecting them to lengthy interrogations.  The 
isolated suspect is then subject to the coercive tactics of alternately minimizing and 
maximizing the severity and consequences of the crime, and bluffing the suspect into 
believing that there is physical evidence against them.  Minimization is particularly 
problematic, as the police officer’s quiet reassurance that the crime was not as bad as it 
seemed, and that it was not the suspect’s fault, while offering an alternate face-saving excuse 
for the suspect’s supposed actions, seems relatively harmless.  Yet, minimization is 
remarkably effective at encouraging innocent people to confess by implying that a confession 
will result in leniency (Horgan, Russano, Meissner, & Evans, 2012; Russano, Meissner, 
Narchet, & Kassin, 2005), without crossing the legal boundaries into explicitly offering a 
reduced penalty in turn for the confession.  While previous research has indicated that jurors 
are sensitive to, but dismissive of, the issue of coerced confessions (Kassin & Sukel, 1997), 
recent research findings suggest that jurors are more inclined to view techniques such as 
minimization increasing the likelihood of false confessions (Horgan et al., 2012), and reduce 
their belief in suspect guilt accordingly (Woestehoff & Meissner, 2016).   
In the same way that lenience can be implied but not offered, false evidence ploys 
(that only imply that evidence exists against the suspect) are legally acceptable in some 
countries, but not others (Woody, Forrest, & Yendra, 2014).  Unfortunately, research has 
shown that jurors are unable to distinguish between explicit and implicit false evidence ploys, 
and that jurors are equally deceived by both (Woody et al., 2014), providing no safeguard for 
the innocent suspect if they have been bluffed into confessing.  While evidence cannot be 
physically fabricated, some police are able to bluff that they may have evidence against a 
person in order to induce a confession (e.g., dropping a large manila folder of ‘evidence’ on 
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the table, without revealing that it is full of plain paper).  The effectiveness of the bluff 
technique illustrates what Kassin (2012) calls the ‘innocence paradox’, in which innocence 
itself becomes a contributing factor in the confession.  In the bluff, the police imply that 
objective evidence of the innocent suspect’s guilt has been obtained.  The paradox is that the 
innocent person knows that the evidence cannot prove them guilty and latches on to it as a 
way of clearing their name.  In confessing, the innocent person believes that they can cease 
the interrogation, and move on to proving their innocence using the evidence they know 
cannot be linked to them.    
1.4 Juror perception of confession evidence 
Unsurprisingly, confessions are convincing to jurors.  It is not difficult to imagine that 
a juror would conclude that a suspect is guilty of the crime they confessed to, especially when 
confirmed by scientifically-verified inculpatory evidence, such as fingerprint analysis.  
However, while the judge decides admissibility of confession evidence based on whether the 
confession was elicited legally or not, part of a juror’s role is to decide whether confessions 
deemed admissible are a valid indication of a suspect’s guilt.  In short, while the interrogation 
process might adhere to legal requirements (making the confession admissible as evidence in 
court), the reliability of the confession might be in question due to the manipulation of the 
suspect in legal, but ethically– and psychologically– dubious ways.  Each juror must decide 
whether the confession is a reliable enough piece of evidence on which to base their verdict 
decision.  Unfortunately for innocent suspects, false confessions cannot be detected as 
accurately as some jurors might believe.  
The following sections discuss some of the problems jurors face when evaluating 
confession evidence, and some of the broader mechanisms through which false confessions 
can contribute to miscarriages of justice. 
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1.4.1 Evaluating confession evidence 
Unfounded beliefs in the ability of police, and people in general, to detect deception 
can cause problems when considering false confession evidence.  Police (in some countries 
but not others) are reassured that their training allows them to accurately detect deception 
through observation of verbal and non-verbal cues (resulting in the guilt-presumptive 
questioning discussed earlier) (Reid & Inbau, 2011).  While the popular Reid Behavior 
Analysis Interview is marketed as training officers to detect truth from lies with 85% 
accuracy, research shows that officers are only able to detect 72% of lies in high-stakes 
situations (Wright Whelan, Wagstaff, & Wheatcroft, 2015).  While high-stakes, real-life 
situations also prompt fairly high detection rates in civilians (68%) (Wright Whelan et al., 
2015), in low-stakes situations civilians perform no better than chance (54%) (Bond & 
DePaulo, 2006).  However, when judging the veracity of confession evidence, other studies 
have shown civilians to outperform trained police officers.  Kassin, Meissner, and Norwick 
(2005) tested whether students or police investigators would more accurately determine 
which confessions (recorded by inmates) were true and which were false.  Police officers 
were less accurate than the students, but more confident in their judgments, and were more 
likely to judge confessors as guilty.  These findings indicate that jurors may have misplaced 
faith in the ability for police officers to have charged the correct person in the first instance, 
and that this has carry-on effects when guilt-presumptive interrogation leads to a confession.   
1.4.2 Content of false confessions 
To add to the difficulty in detecting and rejecting a false confession, research has 
shown that false confessions often contain the kind of richly detailed narrative that might 
only be expected from someone who had witnessed the crime first-hand (Garrett, 2010).  
While police officers are cognizant of the need to refrain from leaking information to the 
suspect in order to maintain the informational validity of the confession, the number of false 
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confession cases in which the suspect was able to give information known only to the real 
perpetrator or police, would indicate that police do not always keep the known facts as 
confidential as they should (Garrett, 2010).  Appelby, Hasel, and Kassin (2013) analyzed 20 
false confessions and found that all confessions covered the basic facts of the crime (e.g., 
location, time) as well as describing visual details, and referencing the victim and their 
behavior.  They also found that the examined false confessions commonly contained 
references to how the suspect felt at the time of the crime, their motives for committing the 
crime, and sometimes remorse for their actions.  Increasing the detail of a confession not only 
renders it indistinguishable from a true confession, but also increases the likelihood of 
conviction.  Research has found that jurors are more convinced that a person is guilty of the 
crime if their confession elaborates upon how the crime was committed, and why they 
committed the crime (Appleby et al., 2013).   
1.4.3 Contamination of other evidence 
Once the police obtain a confession, investigation generally ceases, under the false 
assumption that they have apprehended the correct suspect.  While other evidence gathered in 
the course of the investigation should remain independent of the confession, confessions have 
the propensity to contaminate supposedly independent evidence and skew that evidence 
towards “proving” the guilt of the suspect.  This ‘snowballing bias effect’ (Edmond, Tangen, 
Searston, & Dror, 2015) sees perceptions of previously ambiguous or exculpatory evidence 
changed to implicate the suspect once knowledge of the confession is made available, 
creating ‘corroboration inflation’ (Kassin, 2012).  For example, a detective who sends 
fingerprints to be analyzed, might mention to the analyst that the prints belong to the suspect 
that confessed, rather than simply asking for the prints to be analyzed and compared to the 
evidence.  This simple act then increases the likelihood of the fingerprints being attributed to 
the suspect (Kassin, Dror, & Kukucka, 2013), providing further ‘proof’ of the veracity of 
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their confession.    The conscious or unconscious alteration of evidence to fit with external 
information, brings into question the presumption that all evidence is independent of, and 
unaffected by, other evidence.  By tainting other evidence, the false confession facilitates a 
sense of evidentiary corroboration that would not have existed without the confession. 
In order to test the evidentiary independence of confessions, Hasel and Kassin (2009) 
staged a theft and then asked participants to identify an assailant from a lineup (in which the 
actual thief was not present).  They later told participants that a different person in the lineup 
had confessed to committing the crime, resulting in 61% of participants rejecting their initial 
identification and making a new identification. Of those participants who did not identify a 
thief from the initial lineup, 50% confirmed the specified suspect as the thief when told that 
he had confessed to the crime.  The results show the ease with which previously exculpatory 
evidence can turn into, or corroborate, inculpatory evidence, and also how invisible this 
process would be to a juror.  Corroboration inflation is not isolated to lay evidence (e.g., 
evidence obtained from non-experts or victim/witness evidence). Expert testimony is also 
vulnerable to the effect of ‘forensic confirmation bias’ (Kassin et al., 2013), where expert 
evidence is altered due to knowledge about the case that is not required for the purpose of the 
analysis, such as whether a tested sample came from the person who confessed to the crime 
(Kassin et al., 2013). 
1.5 The role of suspicion 
A number of theories can be used to understand variability in juror decision making 
and have formed the theoretical basis for the current series of studies.  While some models 
are specific to the forensic setting, such as the Story Model of juror decision making 
(Pennington & Hastie, 1992), other general social psychological theories can be applied to 
juror decisions, such as correspondence bias and attribution theory (e.g. Fein et al., 1990; 
Jones & Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1973; see Kassin, 2012 for a discussion).   
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Research by Fein et al. (1990) on the construct of suspicion (an extension of 
attribution theory by Kelley, 1973) provides a useful framework for understanding how jurors 
might process confession evidence (Palmer et al., 2016; Woestehoff & Meissner, 2016), and 
forms an important part of the rationale for the thesis (discussed further in future chapters).  
Fein’s research has shown that suspicion may be a key driver in reducing the automatic 
acceptance of confession evidence. For example, jurors who adopted a suspicious mindset are 
more thoughtful about evidence than jurors who made decisions based on the assumed 
truthfulness of the confession (Fein et al., 1990). Accordingly, a person engaged in suspicious 
thinking is compelled to question hidden motives behind a behavior, prompting them to 
search for alternate reasons for that behavior (Fein, 1996; Fein et al., 1990; Fein, McCloskey, 
& Tomlinson, 1997).  In this way, increasing suspicion may be a useful tool when 
investigating how confession evidence is processed, and how to encourage jurors to think 
critically about confession evidence rather than accepting it on face value. 
Inconsistencies should prompt the juror to engage with the evidence more closely and 
to try to consider the reasons why the inconsistencies might have occurred. Critically, 
however, suspicion will only translate to reduced guilt judgments if the juror is able to 
generate a plausible alternate explanation for why the suspect has confessed (i.e., a reason 
other than guilt) (as per Fein’s suspicion framework, 1990).  If the juror is able to think of an 
alternate reason for the confession, they will be less likely to give a guilty verdict.  However, 
if the juror is unable to think of a reason why the suspect has confessed then they will default 
back to a guilty verdict, regardless of their suspicion about the veracity of the confession.  
Therefore, in this framework, generation of a plausible alternate explanation acts as the key 
mechanism in changing verdict outcomes, in that inconsistencies in confession evidence will 
reduce judgments of guilt to the extent that they prompt jurors to think of alternate 
explanations for why the suspect might have confessed.   
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1.6 Methodological considerations 
There are a number of methodological considerations when investigating juror 
decisions, some of which are considered here.  The common thread is that of ecological 
validity.  First, whether or not ecological validity is essential, non-essential, or detrimental to 
the research question.  Second, is the choice of stimulus materials and the justification for 
using one type of materials over another (i.e., interview transcripts vs confession statements), 
and how this relates to materials that jurors in real cases would receive.  The final 
consideration addressed is that of measures, and how they are combined to present 
meaningful findings that reflect pre-deliberation beliefs about suspect guilt. 
1.6.1 Ecological validity or mundane realism? 
A common criticism of mock-juror studies is that they are not ecologically valid 
enough to apply findings to real cases, and that no laboratory could hope to replicate the 
complexity of an actual court case.  However, it is important to consider the difference 
between the face validity provided by mundane realism, and the ecological validity that can 
be provided by a laboratory-based task that appropriately assesses the applied construct.  
From a face validity perspective, it would be ideal to conduct a realistic mock-court case, to 
fully replicate the complexities of setting and evidence.  However, such time and resources 
are rarely accessible, and may act to hinder the isolation of the variable under investigation.  
For example, in the current work, we are concerned with understanding the cognitive 
processes that precede and underlie decision making when faced with inconsistent confession 
evidence.  In order to isolate the effect of confession inconsistencies, it is more important to 
remove as much ‘noise’ as possible by not including other possible confounds, such as full 
trial-evidence or video-recorded legal arguments, as they would increase mundane realism, 
but hinder ecological validity.  The future aim is to test the effect of this particular variable, 
and then see whether that effect remains in increasingly varied and complex situations.  
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However, we do acknowledge that a level of realism can help participants get into the 
mindset of thinking like a juror.  As such, the materials used in the studies described in this 
thesis aim for a level of realism that is appropriate to the aims of the task–such as making 
confession evidence appear to be from an actual police file, complete with signatures, 
redacted words, and pro-forma templates from fictional police departments. 
1.6.2 Stimulus materials 
Although mock-juror studies of confessions have often use simple typed confession 
statements to assess juror beliefs of guilt, and such statements might well be presented in 
court, the widespread practice of video and audio recording confessions increases the 
likelihood that jurors will see evidence of the interrogation leading to the confession, rather 
than just the confession statement itself (Kassin et al., 2010). 
The use of an interview transcript rather than a simple confession statement also 
provides a more realistic test of the effects of inconsistencies on judgments of guilt.  The 
simple typed confession in the form of “on this day I took part in this crime” type narrative 
used in the Palmer et al. (2016) study (where factual errors reduced guilty verdicts) may have 
exaggerated the inconsistencies between the single-page typed confession statement and the 
similarly brief police fact sheet due to their brevity.   Additionally, by spreading the 
inconsistencies over a longer period in an interview transcript they become less obvious, with 
mock jurors required to be both observant and sufficiently concerned about the 
inconsistencies for them to elicit any influence over their verdict decision.  Given the 
apparent propensity of jurors to simply accept that a confession is true and not investigate 
discrepancies with due care, the increased difficulty inherent in checking inconsistencies 
across different parts of stimuli will provide a more stringent test of the effects of 
inconsistencies on judgments of guilt, and improve the ecological validity of the results, 
allowing better generalisation to real-world cases.   
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With a simple statement, there is no capacity to see the back and forth that might have 
occurred prior to the story being told ‘right’ and with the correct amount of factually correct 
crime scene information.  The lack of clear details and factual accuracy are even less evident 
when a simple statement of confession is constructed in a collaboration between the suspect 
and the police, where all evidence of negotiation over the facts is pared down to a statement 
of guilt.  For example, if the suspect responds, “black” to a question about the color of 
electrical tape used in an attack, and then changes their answer to “red” after being asked, 
“Are you sure it wasn’t red?”, the reader can see that the suspect may have been led to 
produce the correct response.  However, in the resulting typed confession statement, the juror 
would simply read, “I used red electrical tape to…”, giving the impression that the suspect 
provided factually correct information to the officer without clarification or amendment.  By 
including a transcript of the interview in the stimulus materials, the use of coercive tactics 
should be more transparent than they would have been in a typed statement of confession, 
allowing the reader to make a connection between the use of coercion and the presence of 
inconsistencies in the confession.  This approach is important in activating the construct of 
suspicion in that, if police coercion is made visible to a juror, they may take into account the 
influence of this otherwise hidden external pressure on a suspect when they have reasonable 
grounds to believe that the suspect confessed for some reason other than having committed 
the crime.   
1.6.3 Scalar variables 
Empirical evidence shows that even confessions of low quality tend to be compelling. 
For example, confessions are not discounted even when they are coerced and later retracted 
(e.g., Kassin & Sukel, 1997; Kassin & Wrightsman, 1980) or when the suspect is described 
as psychologically ill (Henkel, 2008). Further, case studies show that convictions are 
sometimes based on confessions that contain glaring errors about details of the crime (e.g., 
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Earl Washington, who admitted to stabbing a victim 2-3 times when she actually received 38 
stab wounds).  Therefore, dichotomous (guilty/not guilty) verdicts are unlikely to reveal any 
subtlety underlying that decision.  That is, although research says that 80% of juries are likely 
to accept any confession as evidence of guilt (Drizin & Leo, 2004), we are predominantly 
interested in the strength of their belief in the suspect’s guilt.  For example, a juror’s 
automatic belief in the confession (‘they confessed so they must have done it’), may be 
adjusted to something more circumspect when taking into account inconsistencies in the 
confession (‘I still think they did it, but I don’t understand why this doesn’t match the crime 
scene facts’), or upon seeing evidence that the police used coercion (‘I still think they did it, 
but the police didn’t given them much choice other than to confess’).  In order to reveal this 
nuanced thinking, we used a protocol commonly used in juror-decisions research (see 
Appleby & Kassin, 2016; Leippe, Eisenstadt, Rauch, & Seib, 2004; Sauer, Palmer, & Brewer, 
2017; Sommers & Kassin, 2001; Tenney, MacCoun, Spellman, & Hastie, 2007) in which 
dichotomous verdicts (guilty/not guilty) are combined with confidence in verdict score (1 = 
no confidence to 10 = total confidence), to create a continuous variable called ‘judgment of 
guilt’.  The combined score then allows us to see whether the participant is entirely 
confidence that the suspect is guilty, entirely confident that the suspect is not guilty, or 
somewhere in between.  The scores closest to zero indicate participants who had so little faith 
in their own verdict that they might well have chosen no verdict (had it been an option), or 
moved to the opposing verdict with little persuasion. 
1.7 Aim of the Present Thesis and Outline of Chapters 
The way in which jurors process confession evidence is an under-researched area of 
forensic psychology, as it is assumed that jurors simply accept all confessions, and the onus 
must therefore be on stopping false confessions from occurring in the first place.  While some 
researchers have discussed the ways in which jurors are prone to ignoring confession 
Chapter 1: Introduction  17 
 
  
inconsistencies (Malloy & Lamb, 2010), emerging research has indicated that jurors might 
allocate more cognitive resources to scrutinizing confession evidence, and be less inclined to 
believe poor quality confessions, than previously thought (Henderson & Levett, 2016; Palmer 
et al., 2016; Woestehoff & Meissner, 2016).   
The aim of this thesis is to present a cohesive series of studies that investigate how 
confessions influence perceptions of suspect guilt, with special focus on those circumstances 
in which jurors question the veracity of poor quality confessions, and the attributes that make 
jurors more likely to draw the distinction between acceptable and questionable confessions.  
To achieve this, the thesis is divided into two sections – one experimental, and one 
methodological.  The studies described in Chapters 2 and 3 experimentally test how jurors 
process confession inconsistencies and how these inconsistencies then influence their 
judgment of suspect guilt.  Chapters 4 and 5 also use experimental studies to test scales that 
measure the beliefs and behaviors of individuals that could influence juror decision making. 
In Chapter 2, we first tested whether jurors were able to notice inconsistencies in a 
confession, as the overriding belief that all confessions are true might stop jurors from being 
able to recognize/detect that the confession contained inconsistencies.  Second, we tested 
whether the type of inconsistency moderated any effect of inconsistency on jurors’ 
perceptions of suspect guilt.  Findings showed that jurors could perceive the consistency of a 
confession, but that inconsistencies only reduced judgments of guilt if the inconsistency took 
the form of a factual error (in which the suspect got key facts of the crime wrong in their 
confession).  When the inconsistency took the form of contradictions (in which the suspect 
contradicted themselves throughout their confession), there was no reduction in the 
perception of suspect guilt in comparison to a confession that contained no contradictions. 
The following article has been submitted and a revised version is under review:  
Holt, G. A., & Palmer, M. A. The variable influence of confession inconsistencies. 
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The findings from the publication described in Chapter 2, led to the experimental 
research described in the publication comprising Chapter 3.  This publication further breaks 
down the effect of factual errors on judgments of guilt, by testing whether the direction of the 
errors contributes to the effect.  That is, do errors that increase the severity of the crime (those 
that appear to make the suspect look worse), have a differential effect to those errors that 
appear to decrease the severity of the crime (those that make the suspect look better).  
Findings showed that inconsistencies in general acted to reduce judgments of guilt through 
the mediating variable of perceived confession consistency.  However, if jurors perceived 
that the suspect might be deliberately getting the facts of the crime wrong in a way that 
appeared to reduce crime severity, then they were more likely to perceive the suspect as 
guilty of the crime.  This exploratory finding has the potential to explain a portion of the 
variance in the effect of inconsistencies on juror perceptions of suspect guilt (i.e., why jurors 
sometimes convict based on factually incorrect confessions, and sometimes reject them). 
The following article has been submitted for peer review: 
Holt, G. A., & Palmer, M. A. Directional errors in confessions: Comparing the 
effects of under– and overstating crime severity 
Chapter 4 is a methodological paper, testing the suggestion that some jurors will 
scrutinize evidence to a greater degree than others because of an innate inclination to engage 
with cognitively challenging tasks, measured using the well-known Need for Cognition scale.  
Previous research has linked scores on the Need for Cognition scale to juror decision making, 
but none have specifically investigated whether juror processing of inconsistent confession 
evidence is moderated by a juror’s self-reported need for cognition. 
This publication is in preparation for future submission: 
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Holt, G. A., & Palmer, M. A. Need for Cognition and juror processing of inconsistent 
confessions. 
Chapter 5 tested a published, but previously untested scale that purported to identify 
individuals who supported coercive interrogation techniques, as well as those who believed 
that confessions could be coerced from an innocent suspect.   Participants were presented 
with a confession interview transcript, similar to those used in Chapters 2 and 3 where a 
suspect confessed to a physical assault charge.  In addition to completing questions about 
belief in suspect guilt, participants completed the Attitudes Toward Coerced Confessions 
scale (Clark, Boccaccini, & Turner, 2010).  Findings showed that the scale could accurately 
predict which participants would be unconcerned by coercive interrogation techniques when 
judging guilt, and those who would have reduced perceptions of suspect guilt when the 
suspect gave an inconsistent confession that could be indicative of innocence.    
The following article has been submitted for peer review: 
Holt, G. A., & Palmer, M. A. The predictive validity of the Attitudes Toward Coerced 
Confessions scale 
Together, these four chapters contribute to our theoretical understanding of why 
jurors make differential decisions based on inconsistent confession evidence, while providing 
a methodological understanding of how we can better predict and test individual factors that 
contribute to judgments of suspect guilt. 
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2.1 Abstract 
Purpose: Wrongful conviction statistics suggest that jurors pay little heed to the quality of 
confession evidence when making verdict decisions.  However, recent research indicates that, 
in some circumstances, confession inconsistencies may act to reduce guilty verdicts.  In two 
studies we investigated if different types of confession inconsistencies (contradictions, factual 
errors) had differential effects on judgments of guilt. 
Method: Two pen-and-paper mock-juror studies tested how individual jurors judged a 
suspect’s guilt after reading the suspect’s inconsistent confession to an assault.  In 
Experiment 1, confession inconsistencies took the form of contradictions, with the suspect 
changing his story from a previous statement.  In Experiment 2 the suspect made statements 
about the crime that could be proven factually incorrect from other evidence.   
Results:  In Experiment 1, the contradictory and consistent confessions attracted similarly 
high judgment of guilt ratings, with no significant difference between the groups.  However, 
Experiment 2 showed that when inconsistencies took the form of factual errors, judgments of 
guilt were significantly reduced in comparison to a consistent confession. 
Conclusions: The results of the present studies indicate that not all confession 
inconsistencies are treated equally, and that a factual error in a confession might cause a juror 
to be suspicious about the veracity of the confession, while a contradiction will not.  The 
mechanism behind this effect appears to be the ability of the juror to not only generate other 
reasons why the suspect might have confessed if not guilty, but how plausible they believe a 
single one of those generated reasons to be.   
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2.2 Introduction 
Pedro Hernandez was convicted in 2017 for the 1979 murder of six-year-old Etan Patz. 
However, an earlier hearing of this case was declared a mistrial after that jury was unable to 
reach a verdict because a single juror was not convinced of Hernandez’ guilt due to his 
inconsistent confession. These events illustrate the point that most jurors find confession 
evidence highly persuasive of guilt even when the confession contains inconsistencies 
(Malloy and Lamb, 2010). However, the refusal of a juror to convict based on inconsistent 
confession evidence also highlights the idea—emerging in recent research—that some jurors 
are able to evaluate confession evidence more objectively than previously thought 
(Henderson & Levett, 2016; Palmer et al., 2016; Woestehoff & Meissner, 2016).  The current 
research investigated the conditions under which inconsistencies in confession evidence 
prompt jurors to find confessions less compelling. 
While an inconsistent confession is no guarantee that the person is innocent, false 
confessions are surprisingly common, despite their counter-intuitive nature.   Although 
difficult to imagine why a person would confess to a crime they did not commit, statistics 
show that people falsely confess at rates more frequent than common sense might indicate.  
Approximately one quarter of wrongful convictions overturned by DNA evidence have been 
attributed, at least partly, to an innocent person falsely confessing their involvement in the 
crime ("Innocence Project" 2017).  These numbers highlight two important issues. The first 
relates to why people falsely confess. A large body of research has identified interrogation 
tactics that pressure confessions from guilty and innocent suspects alike (e.g. Leo, 2008; 
Kassin, 2008), such as lengthy interrogations (Leo, 2008), and using false evidence (Kassin, 
2008). This research has led to important recommendations for policies to reduce the 
likelihood of false confessions occurring (e.g. Kassin et al., 2010).  However, the widespread 
use of pressurised interrogation techniques that increase the likelihood of false confessions—
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such as the Reid technique (Kassin, 2008)—suggests that false confessions will continue to 
be presented in court. Hence, it is crucial to understand how jurors process confession 
evidence in order to determine the conditions under which false confessions are likely to 
translate to guilty verdicts.  
2.3 The power of confession evidence 
Confessions make for compelling evidence, being described as the most powerful 
piece of courtroom testimony due to an increased likelihood of securing a conviction (Kassin 
& Neumann, 1997).  A confession can be used to press charges in the absence of any other 
evidence, and can result in otherwise contradictory evidence being glossed over or ignored 
completely.  The persuasive capacity of confessions, and why they hold such power in court, 
relates to beliefs about how and why people confess.  Logically, people believe that a person 
confesses because they are guilty (Henkel et al., 2008; Kassin et al., 2010).  Given the 
negative consequences of confessing to a crime, it can be difficult to imagine a plausible 
alternate reason as to why a person would confess if not guilty. Leo and Ofshe (1998) 
describe this phenomenon as the myth of psychological interrogation, being the belief that a 
person of sound mind would not confess to a crime they did not commit, unless physically 
tortured.  This implies that jurors who subscribe to this myth cannot imagine a reason (other 
than guilt) as to why a suspect would confess.   Therefore, such jurors would accept a 
confession at face value, with variations in confession quality attributed to reasons other than 
a lack of complicity in the crime.  This notion is supported by the results of numerous studies, 
including striking demonstrations that jurors are willing to convict based on a confession 
even when the confession was coerced (Kassin & Wrightsman, 1981), was provided by an 
informant with incentive to lie (Neuschatz, Lawson, Swanner, Meissner, & Neuschatz, 2008), 
or in the presence of exclusionary DNA evidence (Appleby & Kassin, 2016). 
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One reason why jurors might not reject false confession evidence relates to the level 
of scrutiny afforded to confessions, in contrast to other types of evidence.  There is some 
evidence that because jurors tend to take confessions at face value, they do not treat 
confession evidence with the same level of scepticism and scrutiny as they would when 
looking at the quality of, and motivations behind, witness or victim testimony (Malloy & 
Lamb, 2010; Palmer et al., 2016; Redlich, Ghetti, & Quas, 2008; Woestehoff & Meissner, 
2016).  In an overview of the way in which jurors process different evidence types, Malloy 
and Lamb (2010) observed that when examining confession evidence, jurors will often ignore 
the same type of inconsistencies that would have caused them to dismiss witness testimony as 
lacking credibility and reliability.  The disparity may be due to the difficulty understanding 
the motivations behind a false confession, while the motivations for an eyewitness to provide 
false testimony are easier to comprehend, such as lying about what they saw for their own 
gain.  
Some well-known cases provide evidence that jurors will accept confessions that are 
substantially flawed. In 1989, five young men were coerced into falsely confessing to the 
sexual assault of a female jogger in Central Park.  Despite DNA evidence that excluded them 
from involvement in the crime, they were convicted by the jury based on confessions that 
were inconsistent with the facts of the crime and with each other.  Retrospective testing in 
2002 revealed the DNA profile of a single suspect, with the five men cleared of any 
involvement in the crime (Garrett, 2010). That the jury were willing to reject the initial DNA 
evidence, and accept multiple inconsistent confessions, suggests that the quality and 
consistency of a confession may be less important than the simple existence of the confession 
itself.   
However, recent research by Palmer et al. (2016) suggests that jurors pay more 
attention to confession inconsistencies than wrongful conviction statistics might suggest.  
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Participants in their mock juror study read materials that included a confession statement of a 
suspect admitting to armed robbery.  The confession was either factually consistent or 
inconsistent with the facts of the crime, and participants were either provided with an 
alternate reason why the suspect might have confessed (police coercion, to protect someone), 
or no alternative reason was provided.  Results showed that participants who read a 
confession statement inconsistent with the facts of the crime were less likely to give a guilty 
verdict than those who read a confession statement that factually matched information about 
the crime.  This result was found whether or not a plausible alternate explanation for the 
suspect’s confession was made salient to the juror.  These findings indicate that some 
circumstances may motivate jurors to generate their own reason why the suspect has 
confessed, despite the general belief that jurors fail to scrutinise confession veracity. 
While wrongful conviction cases, and some studies (Malloy & Lamb, 2010) indicate 
that confession inconsistencies can go unnoticed by jurors, it is clear this is not always the 
case (Palmer et al., 2016).  The focus of this research is on investigating some of the 
conditions that determine when—and how—inconsistencies affect judgments of guilt. 
2.3 Theoretical rationale 
Previous research suggests that the likelihood of jurors generating alternative 
explanations for why a suspect confessed (other than because the suspect was guilty) may 
play an important role in explaining why inconsistencies in confessions reduce jurors’ 
perceptions of guilt in some situations but not others (Palmer et al., 2016; Woestehoff & 
Meissner, 2016).  One reason why confessions are extremely persuasive of guilt relates to the 
correspondence bias (e.g. Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Ross, 1977). Jurors tend to attribute 
confessions to internal factors (i.e., guilt) rather than external factors, such as situational 
pressures associated with police interrogations (e.g., Kassin, 2012; Woestehoff & Meissner, 
2016). The correspondence bias is especially likely to affect jurors’ processing of confessions 
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because it is exacerbated for behaviors that are not self-serving, such as confessing to a crime 
(e.g. Jones & Davis, 1965; Kassin, 2012; Kelley, 1973). 
Crucially, observers are less likely to attribute behaviors to internal factors when there 
is a salient alternative explanation for the behavior (Fein, 1996; Fein et al., 1990; Fein, 
McCloskey, & Tomlinson, 1997; Kelley, 1973). Thus, if jurors are able to think of a 
plausible, alternative reason why a person has confessed (other than being guilty of the 
crime), they will be less likely to attribute the confession to guilt rather than some other cause 
(e.g., the suspect was protecting the real perpetrator, or was pressured by police to confess). 
Based on this reasoning, we investigated whether the effect of inconsistencies on 
jurors’ perceptions of guilt depends on the extent to which inconsistencies prompt jurors to 
generate a plausible alternative explanation for why the suspect confessed. We hypothesized 
that the generation of alternative explanations for the confession would mediate the effect of 
inconsistencies on judgments of guilt, such that the presence of inconsistencies would 
influence the generation of plausible alternative explanations for the confession, which in 
turn would reduce ratings of guilt. 
In the context of this broad aim, we addressed two additional issues. First, we tested 
whether different types of confession inconsistencies (contradictions vs factual errors) 
differed in the extent to which they prompted jurors to generate alternate explanations and, 
hence, the extent to which they influenced judgments of guilt.  Contradictions occur when the 
suspect seems to forget the facts of their own story, and has to correct themselves in order to 
keep the story coherent.  These types of inconsistencies are in line with Brewer and 
Hupfeld’s (2004) definition of the inconsistency being due to distraction rather than error.  
Factual errors involve the suspect making statements that are refuted by a piece of verified 
evidence, such as a police report of the facts of the crime, or photographs of the crime scene. 
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In two juror decision-making experiments, we compared consistent confession 
evidence with evidence containing either contradictions (Experiment 1), or factual errors 
(Experiment 2). Transcripts for the two experiments contained confession inconsistencies that 
focused around key aspects of the crime, including time and place, rather than peripheral 
aspects which jurors might see as inconsequential when deciding the suspect’s guilt.  If some 
types of inconsistencies are more likely to facilitate jurors’ generation of alternate 
explanations, this could contribute to the variable effects of inconsistencies on the 
persuasiveness of confession evidence reported in the literature. For example, factual errors 
may indicate serious problems with the credibility of a story (e.g., “If the person was really 
there, surely they would not have got that detail wrong”), whereas contradictions might be 
viewed as natural irregularities in the confession story. If so, factual errors—but not 
contradictions—would increase the likelihood of jurors generating a plausible alternate 
explanation for the confession. 
Second, we considered the specific mechanism by which the generation of alternative 
explanations might translate to differences in guilt ratings. One possibility is that this effect 
hinges on the number of alternative explanations generated. That is, the greater the number of 
reasons a juror can think of (other than guilt) for why the suspect confessed, the lower the 
perception of guilt. Another possibility is that the effect hinges not on the number of 
explanations generated, but on the subjective plausibility of the best alternative explanation. 
That is, regardless of how many alternative explanations a juror generates, judgments of guilt 
will depend on the extent to which at least one highly plausible explanation is generated. The 
greater the plausibility of the best explanation, the lower the perception of guilt. 
To address this issue, we designed a task to measure (1) the number of alternative 
explanations jurors could generate for why the suspect confessed, and (2) the plausibility of 
the best alternative explanation they generated. After providing a verdict (guilty or not 
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guilty), participants were asked to list any other reasons why the suspect may have confessed 
(other than guilt). If the participant came up with at least one alternate explanation for the 
confession, they were asked to choose the most plausible of their explanations and rate its 
plausibility. 
2.4 Experiment 1: Contradictions 
Experiment 1 investigated whether inconsistencies in the form of contradictions 
would prompt jurors to generate alternate explanations for why a suspect confessed that 
would then, in turn, influence judgments of guilt. If contradictions in confession evidence 
increase the likelihood of generating a plausible alternate explanation, judgments of guilt 
should be reduced. 
2.4.1 Method 
Participants.  Seventy-three participants (53 female) were recruited from 
undergraduate psychology courses in return for partial course credit.  Participant ages ranged 
from 18 to 60 years (M = 27.47, SD = 11.17), and were either reimbursed $15, or received 
partial course credit.   
Design and procedure.  Informed consent was obtained prior to random allocation of 
participants to one of two conditions (consistent, contradictions) of a between-groups design. 
Supervised testing took place in groups (n = 2-12) in a laboratory or classroom setting.  After 
giving informed consent, participants read a confession interview transcript and then 
completed a pen-and-paper questionnaire, with instructions not to change their answers.  
Participants acted as individuals, rather than as a juror deliberation exercise.  Testing took 
approximately 25 minutes. 
Transcript.  The stimulus material was a (fictional) transcript of a police interview in 
which a suspect confessed to a physical assault charge.  A fact-finding police interview (as 
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per the PEACE model) was used in preference to an interrogation, which is used specifically 
to elicit a confession (see the Reid technique), to avoid introducing coercion as a possible 
confound.   At the start of the interview, we learn that the suspect has previously spoken to 
the police, but that a new officer has taken over the case and wants to hear the story from the 
start.  Consistency was manipulated by having the suspect contradict his own statement 
regarding key facts.  The suspect seems unaware that he has contradicted his previous 
statement until the police officer points out the contradictions.  The suspect then chooses 
which version of events he wishes to adhere to, without further prompting.  For example, the 
suspect states that he entered the victim’s house through an unlocked garage door.  When the 
police officer asks if that agrees with his previous statement, the suspect responds, “No, 
that’s right.  It was the other way round.  I got into the house by the front door, but I left 
through the garage.” The transcript materials are available as Supporting Information online.   
Measures. Participants were asked a number of case-related questions, including 
whether they found the suspect guilty or not guilty of the assault charge, and how confident 
they were in their verdict decision, from 1 (“not at all confident”) to 10 (“totally confident”).   
Verdict and verdict confidence were combined to form a new dependent variable, called 
judgment of guilt, following the method outlined by Tenney et al. (2007). A value of 0.5 was 
added to each confidence score, and the scores for “not guilty” verdicts were multiplied by -1 
resulting in a range of scores from -9.5 (completely confident in a not guilty verdict) to 9.5 
(completely confident in a guilty verdict), with the 0.5 difference reflecting that the original 
confidence scale ran from 1 to 10, rather than 0 to 10.  For example, a guilty verdict with a 
confidence rating of 4 became a judgment of guilt of 3.5, while a not guilty verdict with a 
confidence rating of 8 became a judgment of guilt of -7.5. 
We also analysed the data using the dichotomous verdict measures (guilty or not 
guilty) in both experiments. However, as the pattern of results was unaltered by using the 
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dichotomous measure, we chose to report the continuous judgment of guilt scores to provide 
a more nuanced understanding of how individuals view suspect guilt.  This is especially 
relevant in this type of experiment, where the exact circumstances of a court case are not 
required to test the research question, and dichotomous verdicts cannot accurately reflect the 
strength of individual belief in suspect guilt.  
Manipulation checks of consistency and coercion asked participants to rate on a 10-
point scale how consistent they found the suspect’s evidence (very inconsistent, to totally 
consistent), and how voluntary they believed the suspect’s confession to be (totally 
involuntary, to totally voluntary).  Demographic information included age, gender, languages 
spoken at home, and whether the participant was studying at university full or part-time.   
Alternate explanations and plausibility ratings.  The questionnaire included a measure 
of participants’ ability to generate plausible alternate explanations for why the defendant 
confessed. This took part in two stages.  First, participants were asked to imagine that the 
suspect was innocent of the confessed crime and list any reasons why the suspect might have 
confessed. For example, participant-generated explanations included, “If he did something 
worse and was using this as an alibi”, and “Could be covering up for a mate or brother”. 
Second, participants were asked to rate their preferred alternate explanation (if they gave one) 
as to how convincing they thought that reason was in explaining why the suspect confessed 
(on a scale of 0% - this reason is not at all convincing, to 100% - this reason is totally 
convincing). The score from the favored explanation was used as a measure of the extent to 
which participants were able to generate a plausible alternate explanation (other than guilt) 
for why the suspect confessed. Participants who did not provide any alternate explanations 
were coded with a score of zero for this variable. 
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2.4.2 Results 
Manipulation checks.  The consistency manipulation check confirmed that 
participants were able to discern the inconsistencies in the confession transcript. Participants 
rated a consistent confession as significantly more consistent than a contradictory confession, 
t (66.93) = 9.71, p <.001, 95% CI [3.37, 5.11], d = 2.27.  A manipulation check of perceived 
confession voluntariness showed little difference in perceived voluntariness between the 
consistent and contradictions conditions, t < 1, d =.07 (see Table 1 for means, standard 
deviations and 95% confidence intervals around the means for Experiment 1 measures). 
Generation of alternate explanations. There was no significant difference in the 
number of alternate explanations generated between the consistent and contradictions 
conditions, t < 1, d = .17.  Participants who read a consistent confession gave similar 
plausibility ratings for their favored alternate explanation to those who read a contradictory 
confession, t < 1, d = .12.   
Judgments of guilt.  An independent samples t-test revealed no effect of consistency 
on judgments of guilt, t < 1, d = 0.08.  Participants in both conditions overwhelmingly judged 
the suspect to be guilty of the confessed crime (see Fig. 2). 
Dichotomous verdicts of guilt. Overall, 90.4% of participants gave a guilty verdict.  
There was no significant difference in guilty verdicts between those in the consistent 
condition (93.5% guilty) and the contradictions condition (88.1% guilty), n = 73, χ2 (1) = 
.612, p = .43. 
2.4.3 Discussion 
Experiment 1 results indicate that while jurors were aware of contradictions in a 
confession, these contradictions were not sufficient to reduce judgments of guilt.  More 
specifically, jurors may perceive that the suspect is presenting a contradictory confession for 
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reasons other than innocence.  For example, if the suspect changes their story, or stumbles 
over key facts, this may be interpreted as an understandable imperfection in the retelling of a 
story, rather than a problem suggestive of the suspect’s innocence and subsequent fabrication 
of a confession to escape the pressure of interrogation. 
2.5 Experiment 2: Factual Errors 
Experiment 2 tested whether factual errors in a confession prompt witnesses to 
generate plausible alternate explanations for the confession and, in turn, reduce judgments of 
guilt. 
2.5.1 Method 
Participants and design. Eighty-nine participants (60 female) were recruited from 
undergraduate courses, and the wider university community.  Participants were aged between 
18 and 61 years (M = 27.19, SD = 10.44), and were either reimbursed $15, or received partial 
course credit.   
Materials and procedure. Materials and procedure closely followed Experiment 1, 
with the addition of a police report that combined observed and forensic information.  This 
allowed participants to compare the confession with the police evidence for accuracy.  
Informed consent was obtained prior to random allocation to one of two conditions 
(consistent, factual errors) of a between-groups design.  Participants in the consistent 
condition read a confession transcript that matched the police report on all key facts.  In the 
factual errors condition, the transcript deviated from the police report on five key facts: the 
time of the assault, location of injury, location where the assault took place, point of entry to 
the house, and location of the victim.  The transcript and police report materials are available 
as Supporting Information online.   
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2.5.2 Results and discussion 
Manipulation checks. Confession consistency was successfully manipulated, with 
participants rating a consistent confession rating as more consistent than a confession 
containing factual errors, t (75.343) = 10.00, p < .001, d = 2.11.  There was no significant 
difference between conditions on the manipulation of voluntariness, t (87) = 1.30, p = .197, 
indicating that the manipulation did not inadvertently affect perceived voluntariness of the 
confession (see Table 2 for means, standard deviations and 95% confidence intervals around 
the means for Experiment 2 measures). 
Dichotomous verdicts of guilt. Overall, 69.7% of participants gave a guilty verdict.  
Participants in the factual errors condition gave a significantly lower amount of guilty 
verdicts (51.1%), than those in the consistent condition (88.6%), n = 89, χ2 (1) = 14.823, p < 
.001. 
Generation of alternate explanations.  The presence of factual errors affected belief in 
the plausibility of the favored alternate explanation, but not the number of alternate 
explanations generated.  Participants in the factual errors condition expressed significantly 
higher belief in the plausibility of their favored alternate explanation than those in the 
consistent condition, t (87) = -2.27, p = .025, d = .48.   However, there was no significant 
difference between conditions on the number of alternate explanations generated, t (87) = -
.80, p = .427, d = .17. 
Judgments of guilt.  The effect of factual errors on the plausibility of the favored 
alternate explanation (e.g. that the suspect was covering for someone else) then translated 
into effects on judgments of guilt. An independent samples t-test revealed that participants 
who read a confession containing factual errors favored the suspect as significantly less 
guilty, than those who read a confession that was factually consistent with the police report, t 
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(77.21) = 4.15, p < .001, d = 0.88.  We conducted a mediation analysis in order to investigate 
the mechanism by which confession inconsistency (in the form of factual errors) affected 
judgments of guilt.  Mediation analysis, using PROCESS software (Hayes, 2013), confirmed 
that the effect of inconsistencies on judgments of guilt was partially mediated by the 
plausibility of the favored alternate explanation for the suspect’s confession (see Fig. 1). The 
presence of factual errors increased ratings of the favored alternate explanation which, in 
turn, was associated with lower judgments of guilt, B = -.047, p=.021, CI 95% [-.09, -.01].  
Most importantly, there was an indirect effect of inconsistency on judgments of guilt via 
differences in plausibility (B = -.72, [-2.22, -.064]), showing that consistency affected 
judgments of guilt by altering belief in the plausibility of the participant’s favoured alternate 
explanation for the confession.  The direct effect of inconsistency on judgments of guilt 
(controlling for plausibility of favored alternate explanations) was statistically significant, 
indicating partial mediation.   
Crucially, while the plausibility rating of favored alternate explanations had a 
significant mediating effect on judgments of guilt, the number of alternate explanations 
generated did not, B = -.17, [-1.28, .12].  This indicates that the juror’s belief in the suspect’s 
guilt is not affected by the number of alternate explanations they can think of, but rather how 
strongly they believe that their favored alternate explanation (e.g. that the suspect was 
covering for someone else) can adequately explain why the suspect might have confessed in 
the absence of guilt.   
2.6 General Discussion 
In two experiments, we investigated whether individuals could discern the presence of 
confession inconsistencies (that may or may not indicate a false confession), and if these 
inconsistencies then influenced their judgment of the suspect’s guilt. The results rule out two 
possible explanations as to why jurors often fail to reject false confessions.  The first 
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explanation is that jurors make poor decisions based on low-quality evidence simply because 
they do not notice confession inconsistencies in the way that they would if the testimony was 
from an eyewitness.  However, participants in both experiments were consistently able to 
discern the inconsistencies present in confession evidence, but treated the inconsistencies 
differently by type.  While some inconsistencies were seen as indicators of a problematic 
confession (factual errors), others seem to have been disregarded as inconsequential 
(contradictions).  The second explanation as to why a juror would accept a false confession is 
that they are incapable of imagining why an innocent person would confess to a crime they 
did not commit.  However, our results showed that mock jurors are capable of generating 
alternate explanations for why the suspect might have confessed (e.g. that the suspect was 
covering for someone else), and then using those explanations to alter their internal narrative 
of the crime and belief in the suspect’s guilt, dependant on how plausible they found one of 
those alternate reasons in explaining the confession inconsistencies. 
This research applies social psychological theory to the important applied issue of 
false confessions in wrongful convictions. The findings contribute to frameworks for 
understanding how jurors process confession evidence by identifying an important 
mechanism underpinning the effects of inconsistencies, shaping our understanding of how 
and when confession inconsistencies influence judgments of suspect guilt.  Specifically, our 
data suggest that a crucial mechanism by which errors in a confession reduce judgments of 
guilt is the extent to which the person judging guilt can generate a plausible explanation—
other than guilt—for why the confession was made.  For example, that the suspect confessed 
to cover for the person who actually committed the crime.  When inconsistencies in 
confession evidence prompted mock jurors to generate alternate explanations (other than 
guilt) for why the suspect confessed, this translated to reduced perceptions of guilt.  
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Three corollaries accompany this point. First, different types of inconsistencies differ 
in the extent to which they are likely to prompt jurors to generate those alternate explanations 
for the confession.  Factual errors prompted alternate explanation generation; contradictions 
did not.  This variation in effects between different types of inconsistencies (see Fig. 2) likely 
contributes to the discrepancy in the literature regarding the effects of confession 
inconsistencies (Malloy & Lamb, 2010; Palmer et al., 2016).  Second, the number of alternate 
explanations generated does not seem to matter.  That is, regardless of how many alternate 
explanations were generated, the extent to which inconsistencies translate to reduced 
judgments of guilt depends on the generation of a single, plausible explanation.  This implies 
that competing alternative explanations did not have additive effects on judgments of guilt.  
This finding may have implications for attribution-based theories of social judgment (e.g., 
Kelley, 1973; Fein et al., 1990). Finally, the effect of factual errors on judgments of guilt was 
only partially mediated by differences in the plausibility of favored alternate explanations for 
why the suspect confessed. This indicates that additional mechanisms contribute to the 
relationship between confession inconsistencies and judgments of guilt. Nevertheless, our 
results suggest that belief in a single alternate explanation plays an important role in 
explaining this relationship.  
It should be noted that the aim of the methodology in present research was not to 
simulate the complexities of a real trial.  Nor do we claim to account for all possible 
mechanisms that determine whether a juror will accept or reject an inconsistent confession.  
Rather, our purpose was to isolate one possible variable that might account for some of the 
variation in juror decisions about confession evidence.  By removing the confession evidence 
from the noise of other trial evidence, we can test whether confession evidence alone holds 
the kind of courtroom power indicated by real cases.  Much as the majority of cases where a 
defendant who confessed will be found guilty, participants in our study overwhelmingly 
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believed the suspect to be guilty, regardless of how inconsistently the confession was given.  
However, just like in real-life hung juries, we did find a number of individuals who were not 
prepared to convict the suspect based on a single, poor-quality piece of evidence.  From this 
we can conclude that while inconsistencies might make people concerned about the veracity 
of the information presented, those concerns are not always translated to belief in suspect 
guilt.  Unlike inconsistent eyewitness testimony, which might cause jurors to discount that 
evidence as unreliable, inconsistencies in confession evidence appear to have a smaller effect, 
but do have an effect all the same.  Therefore, defence lawyers would be best placed to 
highlight confession inconsistencies to jurors, and explain how such inconsistencies might be 
viewed to reduce the weight they should give the confession evidence. 
2.7 Limitations and future directions 
The results of the present studies (specifically Experiment 2) run counter to wrongful 
conviction cases in which juries erroneously accepted a false confession as proof of guilt.  
One possible reason for the contrary findings is that the confession in our experiments was a 
multi-page interview transcript, allowing participants to see where inconsistencies arose and 
formulate hypotheses as to why the confession was inconsistent.  In contrast, a typical single-
page confession statement will preclude the juror from seeing any negotiation over factual 
details that might trigger their suspicion about the confession’s veracity.   
The more widespread use of video-recording of interrogations raises the possibility 
that jurors might be asked to evaluate increasingly detailed confession evidence.  Although 
the present research used materials that were more complex and realistic than a simple 
confession statement, other materials that more closely mimic evidence presented in court, 
such as video-recordings or cross examination transcripts, would increase ecological validity. 
Similarly, with regards to a realistic level of trial complexity, our study involved jurors 
making judgments based on a single police interview, rather than multiple pieces of 
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competing evidence (e.g., opening statements; cross-examination) over a period of days.  
Future research might use the approach utilised in other studies (Fein, McCloskey, et al., 
1997; Fein, Morgan, Norton, & Sommers, 1997) where suspicion raising and disambiguating 
evidence are sent separately to mock jurors over a period of time to create a more complex 
and realistic set of stimulus materials. 
Despite some limitations, these studies contribute to existing research into how jurors 
might process confession evidence, by systematically investigating contradictory findings of 
the effects of inconsistencies in confession evidence on judgments of guilt (Malloy & Lamb, 
2010; Palmer et al., 2016).  In line with recent research by Woestehoff and Meissner (2016), 
the findings of the present studies paint an optimistic view that jurors can be discerning when 
evaluating confession evidence. Jurors are capable of scrutinizing confession evidence more 
closely than previously thought, however, not all types of inconsistencies will reduce 
perception of the suspect’s guilt. Similar to Woestehoff and Meissner (2016), mock-jurors in 
our studies showed both the capacity to identify problematic confessions, and to imagine why 
an innocent person might confess in that situation.  However, to sway judgments of guilt, 
solid evidence was required in the form of factual errors, with contradictions proving too 
inconsequential to be of influence. The promise of a discerning juror encourages continued 
investigation into the elements of confession evidence that might dissuade jurors from 
automatically accepting confessions, and making a more considered assessment of their 
evidentiary value.   
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Tables 
 
Table 1 
Means and standard deviations for Experiment 1 measures 
  n M (SD) 95% CI 
Judgment of Guilt    
 Consistent 31 5.83 (3.75) 4.45, 7.21 
 Contradictions 42 5.49 (4.23) 4.17, 6.81 
Perception of Consistency *    
 Consistent 29 7.94 (1.50) 7.37, 8.51 
 Contradictions 39 3.71 (2.10) 3.03, 4.38 
Perception of Voluntariness    
 Consistent 31 7.06 (1.97) 6.33, 7.78 
 Contradictions 42 6.92 (1.98) 6.30, 7.53 
No. of alternate explanations    
 Consistent 31 1.71 (1.66) 1.10, 2.32 
 Contradictions 42 1.45 (1.48) .99, 1.92 
Plausibility of favored alternate explanation    
 Consistent 30 43.27 (29.94) 32.09, 54.45 
 Contradictions 42 39.86 (26.57) 31.58, 48.14 
 
Note. 95% CI = 95% confidence intervals, * = significant difference between group means 
 
Table 2 
Means and standard deviations for Experiment 2 measures 
  n M (SD) 95% CI 
Judgment of Guilt *    
 Consistent 44 5.58 (4.77) 4.23, 7.03 
 Factual Errors 45 .27 (7.10) -1.87, 2.40 
Perception of Consistency *    
 Consistent 44 7.72 (1.54) 7.25, 8.18 
 Factual Errors 45 3.47 (2.39) 2.75, 4.19 
Perception of Voluntariness    
 Consistent 44 7.46 (2.30) 6.76, 8.15 
 Factual Errors 45 6.80 (2.45) 6.06, 7.54 
No. of alternate explanations    
 Consistent 44 1.32 (1.65) .82, 1.82 
 Factual Errors 45 1.58 (1.41) 1.16, 2.00 
Plausibility of favored alternate explanation *    
 Consistent 44 30.36 (34.16) 19.98, 40.75 
 Factual Errors 45 45.76 (29.60) 36.86, 54.65 
 
Note. 95% CI = 95% confidence intervals, * = significant difference between group means  
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Figures 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Experiment 2 - The effect of confession inconsistency on judgments of guilt, 
mediated by belief in a self-generated alternate explanation for the confession (other than 
guilt). 
* ≤.05, **≤.01, ***≤.001 
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Figure 2. Experiments 1 and 2 - Effect of consistency on judgments of guilt.  Error bars show 
95% CIs. 
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3.1 Abstract 
This study investigated how factual errors in confessions that either amplified or downplayed 
the severity of the crime influenced judgments of guilt. In a mock-juror study, participants 
read a confession statement and a police report. Information in the confession statement 
either matched the facts of the crime in the police report (consistent condition), the suspect 
admitted to a worse crime than that outlined in the police report (e.g., firing 10 shots not 3), 
or the suspect admitted to a lesser crime (e.g., firing 1 shot not 3). Mediation analyses yielded 
indirect effects: Compared to consistent confessions, both types of directional errors reduced 
judgments of consistency and judgments of guilt. Inconsistencies that made the suspect look 
better (but not those that made the suspect look worse) also increased judgments of guilt via a 
direct effect. Errors in confessions that downplay the severity of the crime can prompt jurors 
to perceive the suspect as more guilty than errors that exaggerate the severity of the crime. 
This effect may contribute to wrongful conviction in cases where false confessions are 
obtained via interrogation techniques that involve minimizing the harm done in the alleged 
crime. 
Keywords: attribution theory, false confession, juror decision-making, inconsistencies, 
wrongful conviction 
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3.2 Introduction 
False confessions have resulted in a surprising number of wrongful convictions, with 
the percentage of false confessions implicated in DNA exoneration cases estimated between 
16% (Garrett, 2011) and 25% ("Innocence Project," 2017).  These numbers stand in contrast 
to the commonly held belief that innocent people will not confess unless mentally ill or 
tortured (Leo & Ofshe, 1998). Contributing to wrongful conviction rates is the difficulty 
police investigators and jurors have in discovering and discounting false confessions, with a 
general inclination to simply trust that a confession is true.  Drizin and Leo (2004) found that 
30 of 37 proven false confessors (81%) who decided to go to trial, were found guilty by the 
jury, even after pleading not guilty.  This highlights not only the overall acceptance of 
confessions, but the unparalleled power that confessions hold in courts (Kassin & Neumann, 
1997), even when retracted (Kassin & Sukel, 1997; Ofshe & Leo, 1997). 
Jurors are not always best equipped with the knowledge or skills needed to effectively 
apply court instructions, evidence, and legal arguments to their decisions, and might instead 
use heuristics that are not reliable in the unique circumstances of a court case (Bornstein & 
Greene, 2011).  One reason why people find confessions so convincing is the strength of the 
heuristic that assumes that, as there is no advantage to confessing, all confessions must be 
true.  However, there is conflicting evidence in the literature about whether this heuristic is 
robust in the face of inconsistent confession evidence.  Some research suggests that 
inconsistencies in confessions have minimal impact on jurors’ verdicts (Malloy & Lamb, 
2010). In contrast, others have found that inconsistencies can lead jurors to reject a 
confession, resulting in a lower conviction rate (Henderson & Levett, 2016; Palmer, Button, 
Barnett, & Brewer, 2016; Woesthoff & Meissner, 2016).  Such conflicting findings may be 
due to different types of inconsistencies being interpreted differently by jurors, such as one 
suspect giving multiple contradictory statements, versus a suspect giving a confession that is 
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factually incorrect.  There is also the possibility that jurors might process confession 
inconsistencies differently according to the direction of the inconsistency - that is, where the 
inconsistency appears to increase or decrease the severity of the crime.   
3.1.2 Directional errors 
The direction of confession inconsistencies can be important if we think about how 
false confessions come about.  Innocent people sometimes confess to a crime without 
adequate consideration of the consequences.  One of the reasons why this can occur is 
because the person believes confessing is the only way to stop a stressful interrogation and 
begin the process of clearing their name (Kassin, 2005, 2012; Leo & Drizin, 2010).  In order 
to produce a confession believable enough to satisfy the interrogator, the innocent suspect 
creates a story using the information they have at hand.  This might include details that have 
been learned during the interrogation process, seen in the media, or those which could be 
deduced using logic or common sense.  However, the innocent suspect is at a disadvantage 
when creating an accurate confession as they do not usually have first-hand knowledge of the 
crime.  In their ignorance of the specifics of the crime, the suspect might inadvertently 
understate or overstate key details, such as admitting to shooting the victim too few or too 
many times compared to the actual wounds inflicted.   
Some police interrogation techniques may increase the possibility of a suspect 
confessing to an understated version of a crime.  The commonly used Reid technique (Inbau, 
Reid, Buckley, & Jayne, 2013) advocates the use of minimization in the police interrogation 
process, in which the police officer attempts to elicit a confession by downplaying the 
severity or consequences of the crime and providing the suspect with face-saving excuses for 
their involvement (Horgan et al., 2012).  The use of such minimization techniques has been 
shown to increase the likelihood of both true and false confessions alike (Russano, Meissner, 
Narchet, & Kassin, 2005), providing another important reason for investigating the effect of 
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directional errors on how jurors perceive the suspect’s level of guilt when processing 
confession evidence. 
The aim of the present study was to investigate how factual errors in confessions that 
either understated or overstated the severity of the crime influenced judgments of guilt.   
3.2.2 Attribution Theory 
Kelley’s (1973) attribution theory holds that the inferences an observer draws from 
another’s behavior depends on attributions about the motive underlying that behavior.  An 
important implication of this principle is that a particular behavior can lead to very different 
inferences depending on the attributions made by the observer. A classic example of this 
principle involves an observer who sees a student helping a professor. On one hand, the 
observer may attribute this behavior to the student’s helpful nature.  On the other, if the 
observer is aware of an ulterior motive (e.g., the professor is evaluating the student’s 
scholarship application), the helpful behavior may be attributed to the pursuit of this ulterior 
motive. Thus, the same behavior (a student helping a professor) can lead to very different 
inferences about the underlying cause of the behavior, depending on the attributions made by 
the observer. 
 We suggest that this principle can help explain how jurors interpret directional 
inconsistencies that they notice in a confession.  We assume that jurors are motivated to 
explain perceived inconsistencies in confessions and will seek explanations for them (Palmer 
et al., 2016).   Further, we expect that the inferences drawn from inconsistencies in 
confession evidence will vary systematically depending on the direction of the inconsistency. 
For example, if the evidence shows that the suspect has confessed to a crime that is less 
severe than the facts would imply (e.g., admitting to firing one shot when there is evidence 
three were fired), the juror might reason that the suspect is lying in an attempt to make 
themselves look less guilty in order to attract a lesser penalty.  If so, then inconsistencies that 
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imply a less severe version of the crime might not translate into reduced perceptions of guilt 
(relative to a confession without inconsistencies).  However, if the evidence shows that the 
suspect has confessed to a worse version of the crime (e.g., firing 10 shots, not three), the 
juror might reasonably wonder what the suspect has to gain by lying in such a manner.  As 
there is no perceived benefit in confessing to a crime of greater magnitude, the juror might 
suspect that the confession is the result of an unknown motive unrelated to guilt (e.g., perhaps 
the defendant is innocent and was pressured to confess).  In turn, inconsistencies that imply a 
more severe version of the crime will lead to reduced perceptions of guilt (relative to a 
confession without inconsistencies). In this way, attribution theory provides a framework for 
investigating how jurors not only rationalize the presence of errors in a confession, but also 
how they investigate the types of motivations that might underpin the directionality of those 
errors.1 
Although no prior studies have directly compared inconsistencies that imply a more 
severe versus less severe crime, two published studies have included manipulations of 
inconsistencies with some directional properties. Palmer et al. (2016) manipulated 
inconsistencies by including three details in a confession statement that differed from verified 
facts in a police case file. Two of these concerned non-directional details (e.g., the time of 
crime occurred) but the third detail implied that the suspect confessed to a crime more severe 
than actually occurred: the confession stated that the victim had been shot five times whereas 
the police file stated that the victim had been shot once. In two experiments that included this 
                                                 
1 We note that these ideas are consistent with the Story Model of juror decision-making 
(Pennington & Hastie, 1986, 1992). According to this model, jurors construct an internal 
narrative about a case and then use individual pieces of evidence to confirm or alter this 
narrative. The notion that jurors make attributions about the reason for inconsistencies 
in confession evidence—and that these attributions shape the inferences drawn from 
the confession evidence—fits well in the story model. 
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manipulation, participants were less likely to convict if they read a confession that was 
inconsistent with the case file than one that was consistent with the case file. 
Henderson and Levett (2016) also had participants read a confession that contained 
errors that downplayed the severity of the crime. The suspect confessed to stabbing the victim 
1-2 times, and the police case report stated that the victim was stabbed either 1-2 times 
(consistent condition) or 38 times (inconsistent condition). In two experiments using this 
manipulation, the manipulation of inconsistency had a marginal or null effect on verdicts. In 
a third experiment, the direction of the inconsistency was counterbalanced such that some 
participants read a confession that exaggerated the severity of the crime and others read a 
confession that downplayed the severity of the crime. However, comparing inconsistencies of 
different directions was not the focus of that study, and these two conditions were collapsed 
together when assessing the effects of the inconsistency manipulation. With the two 
directional conditions combined, inconsistency reduced guilty verdicts.  It should be noted 
that the third study conducted by Henderson and Levett found that guilt was reduced when 
inconsistencies internal to the suspect’s statement were present, however this effect was not 
found in the study of confession contradictions outlined in Chapter 2. 
Together, these results align with the rationale outlined above. When confessions 
contain inconsistencies that exaggerate that severity of the crime, guilty verdicts are reduced 
(as in Palmer et al., 2016). When confession contain inconsistencies that downplay the 
severity of the crime, the effects on verdicts are smaller and sometimes null (as in Henderson 
& Levett, 2016, Experiments 1 and 2). However, these studies did not conduct comparisons 
between inconsistencies of different directions; this was the focus of the present research. 
3.2.3 Hypotheses 
In line with Palmer et al.’s (2016) study, we hypothesised that confessions containing 
inconsistencies would be rated as less consistent than confessions that were consistent 
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(assuming people noticed the inconsistencies).  We further hypothesised that juror perception 
of lower confession consistency would influence judgments of guilt dependent on how the 
jurors attributed the reasons for the errors in the confession.  That is, if the confession errors 
increased the severity of the crime and acted to make the suspect look worse, then we 
expected greater inconsistency to be associated with lower judgments of guilt.  According to 
attribution theory, because there is no obvious ulterior motive for the worse inconsistencies, 
jurors might assume that the inconsistencies are an indicator that the person might not have 
committed the crime, (“why would someone make themselves look even worse?  Maybe he 
doesn’t know what happened because didn’t commit the crime?”). 
However, if the inconsistencies decreased the crime severity and acted to make the 
suspect seem better, we predicted that while the presence of inconsistencies would reduce 
perceptions of confession consistency, this reduction would not necessarily translate to lower 
judgments of guilt.  In the case of a better confession, there is a clear ulterior motive for the 
inconsistencies, with the suspect self-servingly downplaying the severity of the crime, (“he’s 
making errors on purpose to make himself look better.  Of course he did it”). 
3.3 Method 
3.3.1 Participants 
Ninety-four participants (67 female, 26 male, 1 undisclosed), aged 18 to 63 years (M 
= 26.49, SD = 9.21), volunteered from undergraduate psychology classes at [redacted], as 
well as from the greater university community.  Participants were awarded with partial course 
credit, or $10 remuneration.   The majority of participants (83%) spoke English as their main 
language at home.  One participant failed to complete the demographic section of the study, 
however, as they completed all questions about the experimental material, those results have 
been included.  Two participants were excluded from the study for misunderstanding the 
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instructions, resulting in nonsensical answers – such as believing that the police report had 
been written by the suspect.  
Procedure   
All aspects of the procedure were in accordance with the Human Research and Ethics 
Council guidelines of [redacted], which adheres to the National Statement on Ethical Conduct 
in Human Research (NHMRC, 2007, Updated May 2015).  Supervised testing took place in a 
laboratory setting in small groups (n = 2-3), with participants giving informed consent.  
Participants acted as individual jurors and no deliberation or discussion took place.  Random 
allocation was used to place participants in one of three confession conditions (worse, 
consistent, better) in a between-groups design.  After reading two pieces of written evidence 
(a typed confession statement, and police report), participants answered the pen and paper 
questions in order, with instructions not to read ahead or change their answers once given.  
Completion time for the task was approximately 20 minutes.   
Stimulus materials 
Participants were given two pieces of evidence from a fictional case: a confession 
statement and a police summary report.  The confession was presented as a typed statement 
in which the suspect admits to committing armed robbery at a service station and discharging 
a firearm at the service station attendant.  The accompanying typed police summary report 
gave detailed information from the service station CCTV footage, including the number of 
shots fired, and confirmation that the safe was completely emptied in the robbery. The police 
report also confirmed that the safe contents had been counted and verified by two staff 
members prior to the robbery taking place.  This was to ensure that participants did not 
dismiss any incorrect statement about the amount of money stolen as being due to an 
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administrative error or unrelated theft by a staff member.  The confession statements 
(consistent, better, worse) and police report are available as Supporting Information online. 
Directional errors manipulation. To test the directional effect of inconsistencies, 
key information in the confession statements was altered so that the confession matched the 
facts of the crime in the police statement (consistent), or the suspect admitted to a greater 
crime than that outlined in the police report (made the participant look worse), or the suspect 
admitted to a lesser crime than that outlined by police (made the participant look better). The 
confession errors were related to key facts of the crime (amount of money stolen, and number 
of shots fired) to ensure that they were salient enough to attract notice, and warrant a juror 
questioning the truthfulness of the confession.  For example, the police report stated that 
three shots were fired and $2,100 was stolen. In the better condition, the confession stated 
that one shot was fired and several hundred dollars stolen. In the worse condition, the 
confession stated that around 10 shots were fired and $10,000 stolen. 
Measures.  After reading the confession statement and police report, participants 
were asked to give a dichotomous (not guilty, guilty) verdict and rate the confidence in their 
verdict on a scale of 1 (not confident at all) to 10 (completely confident).  Previous research 
has found that the majority of people see a confession as an honest admission of guilt and 
will render a guilty verdict accordingly.  Therefore, dichotomous verdicts may not prove a 
subtle enough measure of the possible variation in juror belief in suspect guilt.  A new 
variable of judgment of guilt was created by combining the dichotomous verdict and 
confidence in verdict measures, as per the measure outlined by Tenney, MacCoun, Spellman, 
and Hastie (2007).  Following the verdict and confidence questions, participants were asked 
to rate the consistency of facts of the crime between the two pieces of evidence (from 1 – not 
consistent at all, to 10 – completely consistent).  To prime participants to think more closely 
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about the consistency of the evidence, they were asked to list why they thought differences (if 
any) between the pieces of evidence might have occurred.   
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Dichotomous verdicts of guilt 
Overall, 85.1% of participants gave a guilty verdict.  There was no significant difference in 
guilty verdicts between the consistent (90.6%), better (83.3%), and worse (81.3%) 
conditions, n = 94, χ2 (2) = 1.22, p = .54. 
3.4.2 Judgment of guilt 
Table 1 shows the means, standard deviations and confidence intervals for judgments 
of guilt and perception of consistency ratings for each of the conditions. 
Mediation analyses (see Fig. 1) were conducted to test whether the effect of the 
directional manipulations on judgments of guilt were mediated by perceived consistency 
(from the consistency manipulation check).  Perceived consistency was considered an 
important mediator as the actual presence of inconsistencies might be unrelated to whether 
participants consciously noticed the inconsistencies or not.  A similar concept was explored 
in Palmer et al. (2016), where the degree of perceived consistency (as measured by the 
number of inconsistencies reported) mediated the effect of their manipulation on juror 
verdicts.  To test the directional inconsistencies in the present study, two separate mediation 
analyses were conducted: consistent versus better, and consistent versus worse.   
When broken down into its components, the results of the consistent versus better 
conditions (N = 61) suggest that there were two different effects occurring. First, there was a 
significant indirect effect, in which the presence of inconsistencies reduced perceived 
confession consistency, (a), b = -3.71, p < .001, [-4.55, -2.89].  In turn, as perception of 
confession consistency reduced, judgments of guilt were similarly reduced (b), b = 1.34, p < 
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.001, [.61, 2.07].  The significant indirect effect of inconsistencies on judgments of guilt (ab) 
confirms that confession errors overall reduced judgments of guilt by decreasing perceived 
consistency, (b = -4.99, [-8.42, -1.72]).  This finding replicates the indirect effect of 
inconsistencies found in Palmer et al. (2016), and suggests that the greater the perceived 
inconsistency, the larger the reduction in guilt ratings.   
Secondly, and separate to the indirect effect, the direct effect of inconsistencies (c) 
operated in the opposite direction (b = 3.84, p = .036, [.26, 7.42]), with inconsistent 
testimony increasing judgments of guilt. The direct effect shows inconsistencies that made a 
person look better were associated with higher judgments of guilt, although the mechanism 
behind this effect is different to that of indirect effect of perceived consistency. This is 
consistent with the idea that errors downplaying harm lead to higher guilt ratings 
(independent of perceived consistency).   
The results of the consistent versus worse conditions (N = 62) reflected similar 
findings to the consistent vs better conditions for the indirect effect, but not the direct effect. 
For the consistent versus worse conditions, the presence of inconsistencies significantly 
reduced perceived consistency (a), b = -2.10, t = -10.56, p < .001, [-2.50, -1.71], with lower 
perceived consistency in turn resulting in lowered judgments of guilt (b), b = 1.06,  t = 2.26, 
p = .028 [.12, 2.00].  The significant indirect effect of inconsistencies on judgments of guilt 
(ab), b = -4.99, [-8.42, -1.72], also aligns with the indirect effect of inconsistencies on 
verdicts found by Palmer et al. (2016).  However, unlike in the consistent vs better condition, 
there was no significant effect of the manipulation on judgments of guilt in the consistent vs 
worse conditions (b = .197, p = .428). Therefore, there was no evidence that confession 
inconsistencies that exaggerated the severity of the crime affected judgments of guilt separate 
to the mechanism of inconsistencies reducing juror perception of confession consistency.  
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3.4.2 Downplaying of guilt 
The following analysis (see Fig. 2) was initiated by a number of responses to the 
verbatim question about evidentiary consistency, and was not hypothesised a priori.  In order 
to explore what attributions participants made about the directional confession 
inconsistencies, participants had been asked to note if they found any inconsistencies between 
the two pieces of evidence, and explain why they thought those inconsistencies may have 
occurred.  Responses were coded as to whether the participant believed that the confession 
inconsistencies were due to the suspect deliberately making his actions seem less severe.  
Examples of responses coded as downplaying included, “cash amount differed – this was 
probably due to the perpetrator deliberately trying to downplay his actions”, and “the person 
who robbed the place is trying to make the crime a lot less serious than it actually was”.  
Responses unrelated to downplaying (and therefore not coded) included, “Accused may have 
thought he only fired one shot due to the panic and confusion of the situation and how scared 
he may have been”. 
Chi square analysis revealed a significant difference between the consistent and better 
conditions on the number of participants who gave downplaying as a reason for the 
confession inconsistencies, χ2 (1) = 11.23, p < .001.  Nine of the 30 participants in the better 
condition responded that confession inconsistencies were due to the suspect deliberately 
making his actions seem less severe.  No participants in the consistent or the worse 
conditions believed that the suspect was deliberately trying to downplay the crime.  
Responses in the worse condition were too diverse to be coded into clear categories for the 
purpose of further analysis, and generally reflected a broad perception that the suspect was an 
inexperienced criminal who was not capable of estimate large sums of money, or remaining 
calm enough to count the shots he fired.  Examples of responses included, “if this was his 
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first offence, $2,000 may look like $10,000 to him”, and “this might be due to the robber 
being in a hurry to leave and didn’t count or was illiterate”.   
A t-test was used to analyse differences in judgments of guilt between those in the 
better condition who specifically mentioned the suspect deliberately downplaying the crime, 
and those in the same condition who did not mention this possibility.  The mean judgment of 
guilt was significantly higher for those who believed the suspect to be deliberately attempting 
to downplay the crime (M = 8.28, SD = 1.09), compared to those who did not mention 
downplaying as a reason for the confession inconsistencies (M = 4.74, SD = 6.23), t (22.68) = 
-2.52, p = .019. 
3.5 Discussion 
Results showed that participants were clearly able to see when inconsistencies were 
present in the confessions.  However, the direction of confession inconsistencies affected 
juror decisions in a way that we had not hypothesised. We predicted that the two types of 
confession inconsistencies (better, worse) would both affect perceptions of confession 
consistency, but that they would differ in their relationship between perceived consistency 
and judgments of guilt.  We hypothesised that greater perceived inconsistency would 
translate to lower judgments of guilt for worse confessions, but not for better confessions.  
Instead, results showed that both types of inconsistencies were well detected by participants, 
which translated to lower judgments of guilt for both the worse and better conditions. The 
effect of confession inconsistencies is more robust than expected, with participants noticing 
and acting on inconsistent evidence, regardless of the direction of the inconsistency.  This 
finding is consistent with Woestehoff and Meissner (2016), who found that jurors were more 
sensitive than expected to the situational pressures surrounding false confessions, suggesting 
that juror beliefs and understandings might be changing in a way that gives promise of a 
more thoughtful and knowledgeable juror than previously indicated. 
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In all conditions, the effect of the consistency manipulation on judgments of guilt was 
mediated by perception of consistency.  This indicates that the effect of inconsistencies is 
reliant on the participant both noticing the inconsistencies and then perceiving them to be 
inconsistent.  The important role that perception of consistency might play in affecting 
judgments of guilt can be related to theoretical reasoning about how jurors might use 
information in their decision making process.   Theories of decision making imply that a 
juror’s internal narrative of the crime adapts to accommodate information that has not 
specifically been provided, such as motivation (Kelley, 1973; Pennington & Hastie, 1986), 
and this information may act to alter their judgments of guilt.  In the present study motivation 
for the confession can be extended to encompass the suspect’s reasons for giving a 
confession that is partly inconsistent with the facts of the crime. 
Crucially, there was a difference in the direct effect of inconsistencies on judgments 
of guilt between the better and worse conditions.  In the better condition (but not the worse) 
there was a direct effect indicating that inconsistencies acted to increase judgments of guilt 
through a mechanism unrelated to the degree of perceived consistency.  This suggests that, 
regardless of the extent to which the confession was perceived as inconsistent, 
inconsistencies that were seen as an attempt to deliberately downplay the severity of the 
crime triggered higher ratings of guilt.   
3.5.1 The backlash effect of the ‘better’ confession  
While mediation analysis showed that inconsistencies overall acted to reduce 
judgments of guilt, when the suspect confessed to a lesser version of the crime there was a 
backlash in which judgments of guilt increased.  The apparent mechanism behind the 
backlash is that, if the juror believed that the inconsistencies were an attempt by the suspect 
to deliberately downplay the severity of the crime, then the suspect would be given a higher 
judgment of guilt than if the juror did not believe the suspect was lying for their own gain.  
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Verbatim responses about why there were inconsistencies between the suspect’s confession 
and the police report frequently indicated a perception that the suspect was an experienced 
criminal, who deliberately lied about the crime in order to reduce his sentence.  Participants 
in the better condition who specifically mentioned that the inconsistencies between the 
confession and police report could be explained by the suspect deliberately downplaying the 
crime severity, judged the suspect as guiltier than those who did not mention downplaying as 
a possible explanation for the inconsistencies.   
This backlash suggests that, while errors in a confession could act to supress 
automatic judgment heuristics in jurors (where a confession is analogous to guilt), this 
suppression is less likely if the inconsistencies make the suspect look like they are 
understating the crime.  When a suspect appears to be denying the severity of the crime, thus 
reducing their admitted culpability, the denial acts to increase the belief that the confession is 
an admission of guilt, with the denial of responsibility for the full crime rejected on the basis 
of a strong ulterior motive to deceive.  This finding highlights an additional reason why the 
use of minimization techniques in police interrogations is problematic.  That is, not only does 
minimization increase the risk of an understated false confession by suggesting to the suspect 
that the crime is not so terrible after all (Horgan et al., 2012; Russano et al., 2005), but the 
resulting false confession can then inflate jurors’ perceptions of that suspect’s guilt later on if 
the confession details a lesser version of the crime. 
3.5.2 Limitations 
A common criticism of mock juror studies is that court cases are, by their nature, 
infinitely more variable and complex than can be replicated in a laboratory setting.  In the 
present study there is no attempt to claim that the methodology captures an entirely realistic 
jury experience and that findings can be mapped directly on to any single case involving a 
false confession.  However, this does not reduce the applied nature of the findings.  For 
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example, participants in Kassin and Kiechel’s (1996) experiment were coerced into falsely 
confessing to crashing a computer program in a laboratory.  While those participants are 
clearly not in the same position as a person being wrongfully accused of murder in a police 
interrogation, the findings of that experiment allowed greater understanding of the situational 
pressures that can increase the likelihood of an innocent person confessing.  Similarly, our 
work aims to illustrate the situations in which people are able to consider the inconsistencies 
in confessions in a way that inspires new thinking about how jurors might be processing 
evidence that is of varying quality.  The present study also helps explain how people might 
process directional errors when they come across them in confession evidence, and how that 
might then affect their perception of a suspect’s guilt.  Ongoing study into the source of 
variance in juror decision making allows researchers to make possible advances in 
understanding how and why jurors sometimes make wrong decisions based on poor-quality 
evidence.  The hope is that such research can eventually be applied to the ongoing 
improvement and evolution of legal processes.   
3.5.3 Summary 
This study applied principles of attribution theory to an important applied issue–that 
of the ways in which jurors process confession evidence.  The way in which a juror might 
make attributions about the errors in a suspect’s confession is important when considering 
why juries accept some false confessions, but dismiss others.  The present study shows that a 
person confessing to a crime will be overwhelmingly judged as guilty, but if they then 
understate the crime, some jurors will be even more certain that they are guilty.  As a jury 
would not know if the confession was false, an accidental error that reduces the severity of 
the crime could act to make jurors even more certain that the person has committed the crime, 
even though the error itself should make them question the confession’s veracity.    
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Table 1 
Mean judgment of guilt and perception of confession consistency scores 
  n M (SD) 95% CI 
Judgment of Guilt    
 Consistent 31 6.95 (4.50) 5.30, 8.60 
 Worse 32 5.27 (5.77) 3.19, 7.35 
 Better 30 5.80 (5.47) 3.76, 7.84 
   
Perception of Consistency    
 Consistent 32 8.98 (.97) 8.63, 9.34 
 Worse 31 4.77 (1.95) 4.06, 5.49 
 Better 30 5.27 (2.08) 4.50, 6.04 
Note. 95% CI = 95% confidence intervals 
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Figure 1. Mediation model testing the effect of inconsistencies (consistent vs better, 
consistent vs worse) on judgments of guilt, mediated by perceived consistency of the 
confession 
  
Perceived Consistency 
(Mediator) 
Inconsistencies 
(Predictor) 
Judgments of guilt 
(Outcome) 
a b 
c  
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Figure 2. Model testing the effect of inconsistencies (consistent versus better) on whether 
participants believed the suspect was deliberately downplaying the crime, and the subsequent 
effect of that belief on judgments of guilt 
 
 
Mention of 
downplaying (yes/no) 
Inconsistencies 
(consistent vs better) 
Judgment of guilt 
 
χ2 (1) = 11.23, p < .001 
 
t (22.68) = -2.52, p = .019 
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Chapter 4 
Need for cognition and juror perception of confession evidence quality 
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4.1 Abstract 
Need for cognition has been suggested as a personality factor that may influence 
jurors when evaluating evidence in a trial.  However, previous research using the Need for 
Cognition (NC) scale (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984) as a moderator in juror decisions of 
guilt has yielded varying results.  In addition, while NC has been tested across many evidence 
types, there have been few studies with confession evidence as the primary stimulus. Due to 
the contradictory nature of previous findings, as well as the understanding that confessions 
are treated differently to other types of evidence, we tested the moderating effect of NC on 
judgments of guilt with confession evidence as the stimulus.  The current series of four 
studies involved presenting participants with a confession (manipulated to be problematic in 
terms of inconsistencies or police coercion), before completing measures including verdict 
preference, and the Need for Cognition scale.  Findings for all four studies revealed null 
results, with no moderating effect of NC on judgments of suspect guilt.  Theoretical and 
applied implications are discussed. 
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4.2 Introduction 
For individuals who enjoy the challenge of solving difficult problems, the process of 
serving on a jury, weighing up conflicting arguments and evidence in order to come to a well-
informed, fair verdict, would likely prove a satisfying task.  Such people are described as 
being high in need for cognition (NC), due to their overall enjoyment of thinking, and 
propensity to seek out experiences that require an elevated level of thinking and engagement.  
High NC is a desirable trait in jurors, who should provide a sense of determination and 
gravitas befitting the legal process, while those with low NC are seen as the ‘doers’ rather 
than the ‘thinkers’ (e.g. Cacioppo & Petty, 1982).  As such, NC is a likely moderator in juror 
decision making, where high levels of engagement should reasonably be correlated with 
accurate and thoughtfully determined verdict decisions.  NC is predominantly measured 
using the Need for Cognition scale, developed by Cacioppo and Petty (1982).  The NC scale 
is a reliable measure, used to assess the level to which individuals are inherently motivated to 
seek out and enjoy experiences that involve higher levels of thinking.  The 18-question 
version of the NC scale (Cacioppo et al., 1984) asks participants to rate their agreement on a 
Likert-type scale to statements such as, “I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles I must 
solve”. Nine reverse scored items contained statements such as, “I only think as hard as I 
have to”.  
Research findings regarding the contribution of NC in understanding factors that 
moderate juror decision making have been mixed.  Leippe (2016) tested the effect of lax 
versus stringent definitions of ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ on mock-juror verdicts using 
complex stimulus materials designed to simulate a trial.  NC was found to have a moderating 
effect on verdicts, with low NC mock-jurors only minimally influenced by the stringency of 
the definition, while high NC mock-jurors were strongly influenced to reduce guilty verdicts 
in accordance with stringent instructions.  That is, if jurors were following the judicial 
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instructions about reasonable doubt, then the stringency manipulation should affect verdicts, 
with more guilty verdicts under lenient instructions than stringent instructions.   The results 
from Lieppe et al. are consistent with the idea that high NC jurors process trial information 
more effectively than low NC jurors. 
However, other research has found that NC interacted unexpectedly with juror 
decision-making  Shestowsky and Horowitz (2004) tested mock-jurors for NC levels prior to 
a deliberation task.  Participants were paired with a confederate who argued against their 
position (i.e. for the plaintiff or defendant as required), manipulating the strength the 
argument (weak or strong).  Mock-jurors who were low in NC were found to have superior 
capacity to differentiate between weak and strong arguments and were more convinced by 
strong arguments to alter their initial position.   
At first glance these results suggest that, paradoxically, low NC jurors were 
processing trial information more effectively than high NC jurors.  However, this is not 
necessarily the case; these results might instead be explained by the effect of different 
processing styles, with Kassin, Reddy, and Tulloch (1990) describing high NC people as 
active processors, and low NC people as passive processors of information.  Kassin et al. 
found a similar pattern of results to Shestowsky and Horowitz when testing for order effects, 
with low NC participants more influenced by arguments that followed the evidence, rather 
than preceded it, while high NC participants were more influenced by preceding arguments.  
These findings suggest that low NC jurors might be more susceptible to the recency effect, in 
which they rely too heavily on final arguments, without effectively weighting each piece of 
evidence in the broader context of the narrative of the crime1.   
                                                 
1 Although the present research does not focus on the recency effect, it is important to note that it has 
implications for the overall question of why jurors sometimes convict on faulty confession evidence and 
sometime do not.  If jurors are relying on the most accessible argument (i.e. the last argument), then a closing 
argument by the prosecutor that closes down any dispute over the confession’s veracity is likely to have a 
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Of particular relevance to our research, are studies which investigate NC as a 
moderator in confession cases.  This type of design speaks directly to the issue of whether 
NC moderates jurors’ ability to effectively evaluate confession evidence.  Sommers and 
Kassin (2001) tested the interaction between NC and the influence on confession evidence on 
verdicts, where the suspect was inadvertently caught confessing to a double murder on an 
unrelated police wire-tap.  Participants were told that the wiretap was either admissible, 
inadmissible due to a legal technicality, or inadmissible due to the poor audio quality.  
Sommers and Kassin found that low NC mock-jurors gave similar verdicts, without regard 
for the admissibility of the confession, while high NC mock-jurors altered their verdict 
according the admissibility criterion provided.  When the confession was ruled admissible, 
high NC participants reacted appropriately and rendered mostly guilty verdicts, while low NC 
participants did not.  However, when the confession was ruled as inadmissible due to a legal 
technicality, the opposite effect occurred with low NC mock-jurors giving significantly 
higher guilty verdicts than high NC mock-jurors.  The reason suggested for this particular 
finding is that high NC jurors are more concerned with reaching a just verdict, and are 
prepared to think beyond the provided admissibility status when making their judgment 
(Sommers & Kassin, 2001).  The finding shows that high NC jurors were more sensitive than 
low NC jurors to admissibility information. However, we cannot assume, based on these 
results, that high NC jurors will be more sensitive than low NC to other variations in the 
quality of confession evidence itself, such as the degree of coercion involved in eliciting the 
confession, or the presence of inconsistencies. 
The moderating effect of dispositional factors in confession evidence cases was also 
considered in two studies investigating camera-angle bias in videotaped confessions (Lassiter 
                                                 
disproportionate influence over their decision, as it also acts to confirm the fundamental belief that confessions 
are only given by guilty parties. 
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et al., 2005; Lassiter, Slaw, Briggs, & Scanlan, 1992).  Camera-angle bias describes the way 
that a suspect is perceived to be more guilty if the camera is focused directly on them, 
excluding the interrogator.  As Lassiter et al. (1992) found no effect of need for cognition on 
mock-jurors’, with high NC participants just as susceptible to camera-angle bias as low NC 
participants (Lassiter et al., 1992), a further study was conducted to test whether attributional 
complexity might instead moderate susceptibility to camera-angle bias (Lassiter et al., 2005).  
Where need for cognition is concerned with the motivation to engage in challenging tasks, 
attributional complexity refers to the capacity to make causal inferences.  Lassiter et al. 
hoped that attributional complexity might act as a predictive dispositional factor in 
identifying which jurors would be negatively influenced by camera-angle bias, in a way that 
need for cognition had not.  However, the predicted interaction between attributional 
complexity and camera bias on verdict and voluntariness did not materialize, although 
participants high in attributional complexity were significantly more likely to view the 
confession as voluntary.   
Overall, previous research has produced some conflicting results.  While some 
authors suggest that high NC jurors might be more sensitive to variations in the quality of 
evidence (Leippe, 2016; Sommers & Kassin, 2001), others disagree (Kassin et al., 1990; 
Shestowsky & Horowitz, 2004).  Furthermore, no previous research has directly examined 
whether NC moderates the effect of manipulations of the quality of the confession content 
(e.g. confession errors). 
However, echoing the sentiment of Lassiter et al. (2005) and many others, we believe 
that understanding the attributes of individual jurors is as vital as identifying influencing 
situational factors in unravelling the process of juror decision-making.  It is important to 
assess whether individual differences play a part in judgments of guilt, as this may help 
account for the discrepancy in the literature, and in case evidence, as to the propensity of 
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jurors to simply accept a confession, whether strong (i.e., voluntary and matching the facts of 
the crime) or weak (i.e. coerced; not matching facts of the crime).  We know from wrongful 
conviction statistics that jurors will accept confessions that were patently incorrect, or only 
given under the pressure of police coercion.  Yet, there are also some cases where jurors have 
recognized that a confession is problematic enough to warrant rejection, even at the risk of a 
hung jury.  Therefore, it is important to look not only at attitudes towards specific issues that 
might case differential juror judgments (such as the death penalty, or sentencing of specific 
crimes), but to look to the individual juror.  Being able to understand even a small portion of 
the variance in the processing of confession evidence, helps us to build a clearer picture as to 
why wrongful convictions occur in some situations, and how we can lessen the likelihood of 
them occurring.   
To this end, we examined NC as a moderator of the effects of confession quality on 
judgments of guilt across 4 studies (described in chapters 2-4). In each study, participants 
read evidence relating to a fictional trial and were asked to make a verdict judgment and 
rating of confidence in that verdict (which were combined to compute a judgment of guilt). 
Each study included one or more manipulations of factors related to confession quality (e.g., 
inconsistencies; the presence of coercion). Participants in each study completed the Need for 
Cognition Scale (Cacioppo et al., 1984) after making their verdict and confidence ratings. 
The key question was whether NC scores would moderate the effects of factors relating to 
confession quality, such that variations in quality would have a larger effect on judgments of 
guilt for high NC participants than low NC participants. 
4.3 General Method 
4.3.1. Participants 
A total of 399 jury-eligible participants completed the Need for Cognition scale as 
part of a larger juror-decision making project, comprising four separate experiments.  
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Participants were undergraduate students recruited from the University of Tasmania and the 
wider community, and were paid for their time, or rewarded with partial course credit.   
4.3.2. Stimulus materials 
In all experiments, participants were asked to read confession evidence and answer 
questions based on that evidence.  The evidence booklet contained either a single-page 
confession statement (Experiment 4), or a multi-page transcript of interview in which the 
suspect confessed (Experiments 1, 2, and 3). Experiments 3 and 4 also included a police 
report summarizing the facts of the case to establish the accuracy of the accompanying 
confession statement.   
4.3.3. Dependent measures 
All experiments contained measures of guilt, confidence in guilt, and manipulation 
checks of consistency and voluntariness.  Participants were asked to render a verdict of guilty 
or not guilty, based on the evidence, and rate their confidence in their verdict on a scale from 
1-10.   
Manipulation checks were included to measure the extent to which participants could 
discern whether the confession contained inconsistencies, and whether the confession had 
been given voluntarily or not, with each measure rated on a scale from 0 to 10, with higher 
scores representing more consistent, and more voluntary confession respectively. 
 Following questions about the case evidence, participants completed the 18-question 
Need for Cognition scale (Cacioppo et al., 1984).  Responses were given on a 9-point Likert 
scale (1 = strongly agree; 9 = strongly disagree) to self-report statements (e.g. ‘I prefer my 
life to be filled with puzzles I must solve’).  Total scores had a possible range of 18 to 162, 
after scoring and reverse scoring the individual items, with a median split allowing for 
participants to be categorised as low NC or high NC.  Low scores indicated people with little 
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desire to engage in thinking, beyond that necessary, while high scores indicated people who 
chose to engage in deeper thinking for their own satisfaction.   
4.3.4 Procedure 
The four experiments followed the same procedure. First, participants were provided 
with information on the purpose and requirements of the experiment.  Once informed consent 
was given, two booklets were provided (evidence booklet, question/answer booklet) with 
written and verbal instructions on how to proceed.  Sessions took place in small groups (n = 
2-12) and were supervised to ensure compliance with instructions.  Participants were asked to 
imagine that they were a juror, taking part in a trial, and make an individual decision about 
the suspect’s guilt, without discussion with other participants.  They were informed that they 
were to base their decision based on the information read in the evidence booklet, and that no 
legal knowledge was needed to make a decision.  After reading the evidence booklet, 
participants were able to open the question booklet.  Questions were to be answered in order, 
with no changes to be made once that question had been completed.  As we were testing 
perception of evidence, not memory, participants were free to refer back to the evidence 
booklet at any time while answering the questions and were able to make notes on the 
evidence booklet.  Once a participant had completed the questions, they were debriefed 
verbally or in writing before being allowed to leave the testing room. 
4.3.5 Data Analysis 
Of the 432 participants in total across the four experiments, 399 completed the Need 
for Cognition scale. A total of 33 participants were excluded because they either did not 
complete the NC scale, missed items on the scale, or recorded multiple values for items on 
the scale.  Participants were categorised as being low NC or high NC based on a median split 
(see Table 1).  
Chapter 4: Need for Cognition and juror perceptions  78 
 
  
Table 1 
Mean, standard deviation, median and range of Need for Cognition scores 
 Experiment n Minimum Maximum M (SD) Median 
Experiment 1: Coercion 161 54 153 108.44 (18.92) 111.00 
Experiment 2: Contradictions 70 68 145 111.24 (15.63) 112.50 
Experiment 3: Errors 89 66 156 112.47 (18.96) 113.00 
Experiment 4: Directional Errors 81 71 154 112.98 (18.75) 113.00 
 
Note. Possible scores on the Need for Cognition scale range from 18 to 162. 
 
Each study collected verdict and confidence in verdicts scores from participants.  
These two measures were combined to create a scalar variable, where a guilty verdict was 
assigned a positive score (+), and a not guilty verdict a negative score (-) then added to the 
confidence score (1-10), to create a continuous variable of (-9.5 to 9.5) (as per Tenney et al., 
2007).  The lowest end of the scale describes a participant who is 100% confident in a not 
guilty verdict, with the highest end of the scale reflecting 100% confidence in a guilty 
verdict.  The scalar variable has two advantages over the dichotomous guilty/not guilty 
verdict in that it allows a more subtle investigation of the judgment of suspect guilt, while 
also providing the continuous variable needed for the moderation analysis.   
Total NC scores were used as the moderator variable for the effect of condition on 
judgments of guilt, using the PROCESS macro for SPSS (Hayes, 2013) (as shown in Figure 
1.). While we would not expect NC to have any direct effect on judgments of guilt, there 
should be a moderating effect of NC on judgments of guilt as people with higher NC should 
be more motivated to think about why inconsistencies might be occurring in the confession, 
and what that might mean about the suspect’s guilt. 
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Figure 1. Moderation analysis showing the interaction between total NC and the predictor 
and outcome variables 
Participants were categorised as low NC or high NC through a median split  
4.4 Internal consistency 
Across the four studies, the NC scale showed good internal consistency, with 
Cronbach’s alpha values of .89 for experiments 1, 3, and 4, and .85 for experiment 2 
(contradictions). These values are similar to the alpha of .90 reported for the 18-question NC 
scale in Cacioppo et al. (1984) . This suggests that the NC scale is robust, and that scale 
reliability was not a contributing factor to our inability to find any moderating effect of NC 
on juror decision making in confession cases. 
 
4. 5 Experiment 1: Inconsistencies and Coercion 
Experiment 1 tested the effect of confession inconsistencies (in the form of 
contradictions and factual errors), and the effect of police coercion in the confession 
interview, on mock-juror judgment of suspect guilt.   
Total NC  
(Moderator) 
 Condition  
(Predictor) 
Judgments of guilt 
(Outcome) 
Chapter 4: Need for Cognition and juror perceptions  80 
 
  
4.5.1 Method 
A full description of the method is available in Chapter 5 of this thesis.  Experiment 1 
participants numbered 176 in total (136 female), with 161 successfully completing all 
questions in the NC scale. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 63 years (M = 24.99, SD = 
9.45).  Participants were randomly allocated to one cell of a 2 (consistency) x 
2(voluntariness) between-groups factorial design.   
The evidence in this experiment comprised four versions of a fictional transcript of a 
police interview in which a suspect confesses to a physical assault charge.  The versions were 
altered to include or exclude the presence of inconsistencies in the transcript (where the 
police officer refers back to a previous statement that the suspect made, contradicting certain 
facts), and the presence and absence of coercive interrogation techniques. In the transcript, 
the suspect confesses to assaulting the victim during a botched robbery attempt, after 
previously meeting her to buy a used car.   
4.5.2 Results 
Moderation analysis tested whether total NC scores moderated the effect of 
confession consistency (consistent, inconsistent) on judgments of guilt.  The overall model 
was significant, N = 161, F (3, 157) = 5.40, p = .002.  The main effect of confession 
consistency on judgments of guilt was also significant, b = -3.00, t = 1.59, p < .001, with 
inconsistencies in the confession reducing perception of suspect guilt.  However, there was 
no main effect of NC on judgments of guilt, b = .02, t = .97, p = .335, and there was no 
significant interaction at the moderator, b = .07, t = 1.59, p = .113.  The addition of NC to the 
model accounted for only 1.5% of the variance in judgment of guilt scores in addition to the 
presence of inconsistencies alone.  Thus, NC did not moderate the effects of confession 
consistency on judgments of guilt. 
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The second predictor variable tested in Experiment 1 was that of confession 
voluntariness (voluntary, coerced).  The overall model was significant, N = 161, F (3, 157) = 
3.77, p = .012.  The presence of coercion in the confession significantly reduced judgments of 
guilt, b = -2.53, t = -3.04, p = .003.  There was no main effect of NC on judgments of guilt, b 
= .02, t = .68, p = .498, nor was there a significant interaction at the moderator, b = -.06, t = -
1.28, p = .203.  The interaction added less than 1% to the overall variance accounted by the 
model on judgments of guilt.  Thus, NC did not moderate the effects of coercion on 
judgments of guilt.   
4.6 Experiment 2: Contradictions 
Experiment 2 tested the effect of contradictions in a confession (where the suspect 
corrects themselves after contradicting their own story) on mock-jurors’ judgments of suspect 
guilt. 
4.6.1 Method 
 Experiment 2 participants numbered 73 (53 female), with 70 completing all questions 
on the NC scale. Participant ages ranged from 18 to 60 years (M = 27.47, SD = 11.17).   
Participants were randomly allocated to read one of two police interview transcripts in 
which the suspect confesses to assault and attempted robbery, manipulated for the presence 
of contradictions in a confession (no contradictions, contradictions).  The transcript was 
closely based on that used in Experiment 1, with changes representing the desire to only 
reflect inconsistencies that involved the suspect contradicting his own story, rather than 
taking the form of verifiably incorrect factual errors. 
4.6.2 Results 
Moderation analysis was used to test if total NC scores acted as the moderator on the 
effect of inconsistencies in the form of contradictions in the confession (no contradictions, 
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contradictions) on judgments of guilt.  The overall model was not significant, N = 70, F (3, 
66) = .69, p = .561.  There was no effect of contradictions on judgments of guilt, b = .23, t = 
.25, p = .804.  NC did not have a direct effect on judgments of guilt b = .04, t = 1.25, p = 
.215, and there was no significant interaction of total NC as moderation on the effect of 
condition on judgments of guilt, b = .04, t = .68, p = .497.  The interaction added less than 
1% to the overall variance accounted by the model on judgments of guilt. 
4.7 Experiment 3: Factual errors 
Experiment 3 tested whether jurors would be influenced by confession inconsistencies 
in the form of verifiable factual errors, and reduce judgments of guilt accordingly. 
4.7.1 Method 
Participants for Experiment 3 totalled 89 (60 female), aged between 18 and 61 years 
(M = 27.19, SD = 10.44).  Eighty-six participants successfully completed the NC scale. 
Confession transcripts for the experiment closely resembled those used in 
Experiments 1 and 2, with the addition of a police summary report that outlined the facts of 
the crime (e.g. times given by witnesses, hospital reports, ballistic information).  The police 
report was added to allow comparison with the confession interview transcript that would 
reveal if the suspect had made factually incorrect statements in confessing to the assault 
during the attempted robbery.   
4.7.2 Results 
The overall model was significant, N = 86, F (3, 82) = 5.69, p = .001, with factual 
errors significantly reducing judgments of guilt, b = -5.25, t = -3.89, p < .001.  However, NC 
had no direct effect on judgments of guilt, b = -.00, t = -.08, p = .939.  Total NC scores did 
not moderate the effect of confession inconsistencies in the form of verifiable factual errors 
(no errors, errors) on judgments of guilt, b = .02, t = .37, p = .709.  The interaction did not 
Chapter 4: Need for Cognition and juror perceptions  83 
 
  
contribute any increase in the percentage of variance in judgments of guilt in addition to the 
original model. 
4.8 Experiment 4: Directional errors  
Experiment 4 extended the findings of Experiment 3, in which factual errors reduced 
judgments of guilt, by testing whether the direction of the factual errors differentially 
influenced perception of suspect guilt.   
4.8.1 Method 
Of the ninety-four participants (67 female, 26 male, 1 undisclosed), aged 18 to 63 
years (M = 26.49, SD = 9.21) tested, 82 successfully completed the NC scale.   
This experiment used a single-page confession statement, along with a police report 
outlining the verifiable facts of the case (e.g. CCTV footage), in which the suspect confesses 
to the armed robbery of a service station.  In all three versions, the suspect confesses, 
however in the ‘better’ version the suspect makes errors that appear to reduce the severity of 
the crime (i.e. less shots fired, less money stolen), while in the ‘worse’ version the suspect’s 
errors appear to increase the severity of the crime (i.e. more shots fired than actually reported, 
more money stolen). 
4.8.2 Results 
The predictor variables were analysed separately, with the directional factual error 
conditions split into two groups (control vs worse, control vs better).  For the control vs 
worse group, the overall model was not significant, N = 54, F (3, 50) = 1.51, p = .224.  There 
was no significant effect of condition on judgments of guilt, b = -.82, t = 1.15, p = .255. NC 
did not have a direct effect on judgments of guilt, b = .06, t = 1.53, p = .131, and there was no 
significant increase in variance accounted for as a result of the interaction, b = -.03, t = -.85, p 
= .399. 
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Similarly, for the control vs better analysis, the overall model was not significant, N = 
53, F (3, 49) = 1.27, p = .294.  The direct effect of condition on judgments of guilt was not 
significant, b = -.38, t = -.28, p = .782.  NC also had no direct effect on judgments of guilt, b 
= .05, t = 1.41, p = .163, and did not act as a moderator to the relationship between the 
directional errors and judgments of guilt, b = -.09, t = -1.25, p = .218.  The interaction did not 
significantly increase the amount of variance accounted for above the original model. 
4.9 Summary and general discussion 
The current study presented four experiments in which need for cognition was tested 
as a possible moderator in juror decision making about confession evidence.  Across the four 
studies, NC scores did not moderate the effects of any of the independent variables on 
judgments of guilt. These results suggest that NC does not influence the extent to which 
jurors are sensitive to variations in the quality of confession evidence.  There are a number of 
possible explanations for these findings; 1) that while dispositional factors may well 
moderate juror decisions, need for cognition did not do so in these studies, 2) that motivation 
as the primary driver of NC may not be activated in confession cases, where the confession is 
just assumed to be true, and 3) that trials in general, and especially those that involve 
confessions, artificially raise engagement levels for low NC people so that their motivation to 
solve the puzzle of the case is similar to high NC jurors.  We also note in our discussion that 
while NC did not moderate juror decision making in this instance, that other individual 
differences in disposition may contribute to variations in verdict preferences not accounted 
for by situational factors. 
The lack of moderation indicates that those high in NC did not process the 
problematic areas of confessions any differently to those who were low in NC. This 
contravenes the foundational premise of need for cognition, which is that people high in NC 
are more motivated than those low in NC to seek out and engage with cognitively challenging 
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tasks. In considering how to explain these results, it is important to note that the central 
component of NC is motivation to think deeply on a topic, not the capacity to do so. In light 
of this, our results suggest that participants’ motivation to engage with confession evidence 
did not differ systematically with NC scores. 
One way that this could occur is if participants had low motivation to engage with the 
processing of confession evidence, regardless of whether they were high or low in NC. This 
notion aligns with the persistent belief that jurors do not process confession evidence with the 
same level of scrutiny as they do other types of evidence. That is, if it is assumed that 
someone would not confess unless guilty (Kassin, 2012; Leo, 2008), then it follows that 
confession evidence does not require close evaluation. To the extent that this belief is widely 
held, we would expect that people, regardless of their NC score, would not engage much in 
processing of confession evidence. 
However, this explanation cannot account for the main effects of confession quality 
variables found in our data. That is, if participants tended to engage little in processing 
confession evidence, then manipulations of confession quality (such as coercion and errors) 
would have minimal effect on judgments of guilt, regardless of NC scores. This is not what 
the data show; instead, these manipulations did affect judgments of guilt, and the magnitude 
of the effect did not vary with NC scores. 
A second explanation, raised by Sommers and Kassin (2001), is that trials are 
naturally engaging for all jurors, regardless of NC level. That is, people (whether high or low 
in NC) will be motivated to engage with processing confession evidence when acting as a 
juror. This could result from the evidence being inherently engaging, or from a sense of duty 
to pursue justice. This explanation is consistent with the main effects of coercion and errors 
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found in our data: Participants were sensitive to differences in the quality of confessions, and 
this applied regardless of NC scores.  
 
Therefore, while there might be some individual characteristics that account for 
variance in perceptions of suspect guilt when evaluating an inconsistent confession, NC 
seems to not be such a characteristic. It seems that participants are motivated to engage with 
processing confession evidence regardless of their pre-existing tendency to engage with 
challenging cognitive tasks. 
4.9.1 General discussion and future directions  
There are a number of differences between previous research and the current research 
that may have contributed to our finding that NC did not moderate the condition effects on 
perception of guilt.  Primarily, case evidence and overwhelming research have shown that 
confessions are treated differently to other types of evidence.  Therefore, we may not be able 
to rely on NC studies that have used materials that did not include confession evidence.   
Crime type may also affect the moderating effect of NC.  A meta-analysis of juror 
studies measuring NC (Devine & Caughlin, 2014) revealed that most NC studies have the 
defendant on trial for homicide, raising questions about the generalisability of findings across 
different crime types, such as assault or theft.  Our particular study provides some indication 
that the moderating effect of NC on perceptions of guilt may not extend to violent crimes that 
do not result in murder.   While we have no data to confirm this thought, we speculate that a 
confession for a more serious crime might increase the difference between motivation levels 
of low and high NC participants, in a way that lesser crimes may not.  Future research may 
choose to test this by increasing the severity (and therefore consequences) of the alleged 
crime.  We would also suggest that a further subset of case characteristics be included in 
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future meta-analyses; that of evidence type (e.g. eyewitness testimony, expert witness 
testimony, confession evidence). 
In summary, we found no evidence that need for cognition acts as a dispositional 
characteristic that influences perception of suspect guilt when viewing inconsistent 
confession evidence.  We speculate, as per previous researchers, that real court trials 
temporarily inflate engagement with evidence with low and high NC jurors being equally 
motivated to perform their duties well.  Additionally, the nature of confessions is such that 
they may not trigger the increased motivation to explore challenging intellectual tasks that 
characterises high NC jurors. 
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5.1 Abstract 
Clark, Boccaccini, and Turner (2010) designed the Attitude Toward Coerced 
Confessions (ATCC) scale as a measure of juror beliefs about coercive interrogation 
techniques and the phenomenon of coerced confessions.  Two subscales purport to measure 
support for coercive police interrogations (CI subscale), and belief that confessions can be 
coerced from innocent people (CC subscale).  To our knowledge, the ATCC has not been 
tested for its predictive validity, despite the clear benefit of understanding why some jurors 
will accept coerced confessions as truthful statements of guilt.  The current study asked 
mock-jurors to judge a suspect’s guilt after reading a confession transcript manipulated for 
coercion and consistency, and complete the 9-question ATCC scale. 
High CI mock-jurors did not alter their verdicts when the confession was the result of 
a coercive interrogation, while low CIs judged the suspect as significantly less guilty when 
coercion was used.  That is, the presence of coercion in a confession transcript reduced 
judgments of guilt differently, dependent on how strongly people supported coercive 
interrogation techniques.  The presence of inconsistencies in the confession similarly 
influenced judgments of guilt dependent on whether the person did, or did not, believe that 
confessions could be coerced from an innocent person.  High CC mock-jurors judged the 
suspect as less guilty when the confession contained inconsistencies, while low CCs showed 
no difference in belief in guilt between the control and inconsistent conditions.  Findings 
suggest the ATCC can isolate some attitudes that influence confession evidence, and predict 
which individuals will engage with problematic confession evidence more objectively. 
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5.2 Introduction 
Although it is counterintuitive that an innocent person might confess to a crime they 
did not commit, false confessions do occur and have contributed to numerous convictions of 
innocent people (e.g. "Innocence Project," 2017; Kassin, 2012).  Researchers have rightly 
focused much attention on understanding how certain interrogation techniques can increase 
the likelihood of false confessions, and making recommendations to reduce the chances of 
false confessions occurring (e.g. Kassin et al., 2010). However, until recommended changes 
to interrogation techniques are widely adopted, false confessions will continue to occur. In 
light of this, it is important to develop an understanding of how jurors process confession 
evidence and, in particular, how jurors’ judgments of guilt are influenced by differences in 
the quality of confessions. Such knowledge may pave the way for instructions that help jurors 
to process confession evidence more effectively. 
There is considerable variation in how jurors’ decisions are affected by differences in 
the quality of confessions. Some confessions, for example, contain inconsistencies or may 
have been obtained with coercion. Although such information should lead a juror to question 
the validity of a confession, this is not always the case. Sometimes jurors will judge a person 
as less guilty if their confession is inconsistent (Henderson & Levett, 2016; Palmer et al., 
2016; Woestehoff & Meissner, 2016), and sometimes not (Drizin & Leo, 2004; Malloy & 
Lamb, 2010).  Similarly, sometimes jurors are unconcerned by the use of coercion (Kassin & 
Sukel, 1997), while other times jurors reduce their judgment of suspect guilt if the confession 
shows signs of being coerced (Palmer et al., 2016). 
One factor that might help explain such variation in decisions is individual differences 
in attitudes to and beliefs about confessions. For example, evidence that a confession may 
have been coerced might have different effects on judgments of guilt depending on whether 
or not the juror think that coercion is a reasonable interrogation tactic. In this study, we tested 
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the validity of one measure of such attitudes, the Attitudes to Coerced Confessions scale 
(ATCC; Clark, Boccaccini, & Turner, 2010). Specifically, we examined whether scores on 
the ATCC moderate the effect that factors related to the quality of confessions (i.e., coercion 
and inconsistencies) have on judgments of guilt. 
5.2.1 Effects of Coercion on Judgments of Guilt 
Confessions must be given voluntarily in order to be admissible in court. Some police 
interrogation techniques, therefore, incorporate strategies designed to convince the guilty 
person that confessing is the best option available to them, within the limits of the law.  
Unfortunately, these strategies have also proven effective at convincing innocent suspects to 
confess, resulting in false confessions.  Although the opposite of a voluntary confession is a 
coerced confession, coercive police interrogation strategies, short of physical torture, are used 
(in some countries, but not in others) to produce admissible confessions.  Coercive practices 
include presenting false evidence, refusing denials of guilt, and extended interrogations (e.g. 
Kassin et al., 2010; Leo, 1996). The justification for using such techniques relies heavily on 
the difficulty that people have in believing that an innocent person—unless tortured or 
mentally incapacitated—will confess to a crime they did not commit (Leo & Ofshe, 1998). 
(Note that this belief is somewhat antithetical to the requirement for confessions to be 
voluntary in order to be admissible in court). 
Not only do people confess under coercion to crimes that they did not commit, juries 
are also prone to accepting such confession evidence, even when they are aware that the 
confession has been coerced.  In a test of the ‘harmless error rule’, Kassin and Sukel (1997) 
questioned if mock-jurors would disregard a confession if they were told that it had been 
admitted in error and instructed not to use the confession when making their verdict decision.  
While participants stated that they had followed the admonition to disregard the confession, 
the presence of the confession still increased guilty verdicts, with 44% in the confession 
Chapter 5: Testing the predictive validity of the ATCC scale  93 
 
  
group giving a guilty verdict, in comparison to 19% in the no-confession group. The fact that 
almost half of participants voted guilty despite acknowledging that the confession was 
coerced is consistent with the notion that some people consider coercion to be a valid method 
of eliciting a true confession from a suspect. However, in comparison to other studies, this 
proportion of guilty verdicts appears surprisingly low.  For example, Drizin and Leo found 
that 80% of false confessions cases where the suspect denied the confession and pleaded not 
guilty, were still found guilty by the jury.  The relatively low conviction rate in Kassin and 
Sukel’s study is consistent with the idea that some people believe that coercive interrogation 
techniques can elicit false confessions from innocent people. Thus, overall, jurors may lack 
homogeneity in their interpretation of coerced confessions, with some jurors finding such 
evidence more convincing than others. 
One possible source of such variance is individual juror attitudes toward coerced 
confessions. For example, a juror who supports coercive interrogation tactics is unlikely to be 
concerned that the voluntariness of the confession might have affected its validity, and may 
therefore ignore the judge’s instructions to disregard the coerced confession.  A person who 
did not support coercive interrogation tactics might be more likely to adhere to the judge’s 
instructions.  Thus, a measure that can effectively tap into support for coercive interrogation 
techniques would prove useful in predicting the extent to which coercion in obtaining a 
confession influences perceptions of guilt.  
5.2.2 Measures of juror attitudes   
Predicting how jurors will behave when presented with a piece of evidence in court is 
lucrative business for professional trial research firms (Crocker & Kovera, 2011).  To those 
investigating wrongful convictions, however, the aim is to understand why jurors sometimes 
make the wrong decision, and how such this can be prevented.  For both, identifying which 
jurors are likely to be concerned by inconsistent or coerced confessions, and which are likely 
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to be convinced by them, is an important step in understanding how and why jurors make the 
decisions they do. 
While there are scales measuring juror bias (Kassin & Wrightsman, 1983), and other 
individual differences that may affect juror decisions, such as authoritarianism (Boehm, 
1968), scales specifically measuring juror belief in regards to confession evidence are in 
scarce supply.  Concerned about factor structure issues and low internal consistency of the 
existing Confession Attitude Scale (Wrightsman & Engelbrecht, 2004), Clark et al. (2010) set 
out to create a new scale measuring juror attitudes toward coerced confessions.  The Attitudes 
Toward Coerced Confessions scale (ATCC; Clark et al.) aimed to measure the propensity of 
an individual to question the validity of a coerced confession, rather than simply accepting 
the confession as true, regardless of the tactics used in the interrogation process. 
The ATCC uses two subscales to measure two discrete attitudes toward coerced 
confessions that might affect whether jurors are concerned about coercive aspects of 
interrogation in confession cases.  The Coercive Interrogation subscale (CI) consists of 4 
questions, such as ‘Police officers should be allowed to do whatever it takes to get criminal 
suspects to confess’, that measure the level of support for coercive interrogation techniques. 
The higher the score on this scale, the greater is the endorsement of coercion.  
The Coerced Confessions subscale (CC) measures how strongly a person believes that 
innocent people can be coerced into confessing.  The CC comprises 5 questions such as, 
‘sometimes, people will confess to anything to stop a stressful interrogation’. Higher scores 
on the CC subscale indicate greater openness to the idea that an innocent person might falsely 
confess to a crime they did not commit. 
Clark et al. (2010) found that scores on the two subscales were negatively correlated, 
such that greater endorsement of coercive techniques was associated with lower openness to 
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the possibility that an innocent suspect might confess. That is, high scores on the CI subscale 
were associated with low scores on the CC subscale, and vice versa. Clark et al. also found 
that scores on the two subscales were related to participants’ perceptions of guilt. Higher 
ratings of guilt were associated with higher scores on the CI subscale, and lower scores on the 
CC subscale. 
These findings provide preliminary support for the notion that the ATCC might be a 
useful measure of jurors’ attitudes regarding confession evidence. However, the results 
reported by Clark et al. (2010) may simply reflect a tendency for people who score high on 
the CI subscale (and low on the CC subscale) to be relatively harsh in delivering verdicts. 
Crucially, those data provide no information about the extent to which scores on the ATCC 
predict jurors’ sensitivity to variations in coercion.  This is a central issue for establishing the 
validity of the ATCC.  If the CI subscale effectively taps into level of support for coercive 
interrogation techniques, then scores on this scale will moderate the effect of coercion on 
perceptions of guilt. That is, a manipulation of coercion will have a stronger effect on 
perceptions of guilt among people who score low on the CI subscale (i.e., those who consider 
coercive interrogation tactics problematic), and a weaker effect among those who score high 
on the CI subscale (i.e., those who support the use of coercive tactics).  
5.2.3 The role of attitudes  
The extent to which scores on the CI subscale predict the influence of coercion on 
perceptions of guilt is perhaps the clearest test of the validity of the ATCC. However, scores 
on the CC subscale of the ATCC may be useful in predicting variability in the effect of other 
aspects of confession quality on perceptions of guilt. Jurors are prone to accepting 
confessions that contain problematic characteristics, other than coercion.  In an analysis of 38 
known false confession cases (proven by DNA evidence), Garrett (2010) found that the 
majority contained information that was inconsistent with evidence, such as that taken from 
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the crime scene, or the victim’s testimony.  These cases provide evidence that some jurors 
will accept a confession that contains the type of inconsistencies that would likely cause them 
to disregard a different type of evidence (such as eyewitness testimony) (Malloy & Lamb, 
2010).  Yet other evidence indicates that jurors have the capability to be more discerning 
about problematic confession evidence (Henderson & Levett, 2016; Palmer et al., 2016; 
Woestehoff & Meissner, 2016) and might well dismiss an inconsistent confession as invalid 
evidence of guilt.   
The ATCC subscale which tests the belief that coercion can be used to coax a 
confession from an innocent person (CC), would be well placed to test why inconsistencies 
sometimes result in lower belief in suspect guilt, and sometimes result in wrongful 
conviction.  If we think about how a person might process inconsistent confession evidence, 
an individual who adheres to the belief that only guilty people will confess might attribute 
confession inconsistencies to forgetfulness, stress, drug use, or some other attribute unrelated 
to innocence.  However, an individual who believes that innocent people sometimes confess 
to crimes simply to end the stress of the interrogation, might well see those inconsistencies as 
an indication that the suspect is incapable of accurately reporting the facts of the crime 
because they were not involved.  Thus, the effect of inconsistencies in confession evidence 
would be stronger among jurors who score high on the CC subscale (i.e., those who are more 
open to the possibility of an innocent person falsely confessing) than among jurors who score 
low on the CC subscale.   
5.2.4 Summary 
Our goal was to investigate whether the ATCC, could accurately predict juror 
attitudes towards the use of coercive interrogation tactics, and their general belief that 
confessions can be coerced out of innocent suspects.  To achieve this, we ran a mock-juror 
study in which participants were asked to act as jurors and consider evidence presented to 
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them before making a judgment about the likely guilt of the suspect. Participants were asked 
for their opinion as an individual juror (i.e., there was no deliberation with other mock-
jurors). Evidence was in the form of a police transcript of an interview with the suspect in 
which the suspect confesses to a crime. We manipulated two factors: the presence of coercion 
and the presence of inconsistencies in evidence given by the suspect (details of these 
manipulations appear in the Method).  
We predicted that scores on the subscales of the ATCC would moderate the effect of 
inconsistencies and coercion on judgment of suspect guilt. Specifically, we hypothesized that 
the presence of coercion in obtaining the confession (cf. no coercion) would reduce 
perceptions of guilt to a greater extent for participants who scored low on the CI subscale 
(indicating low support for coercive tactics) than those who scored high on the CI subscale 
(indicating high support for coercive tactics). We also hypothesized that the presence of 
inconsistencies in confession evidence would reduce perceptions of guilt to a greater extent 
for participants who scored high on the CC subscale (indicating higher belief in the 
possibility of false confessions occurring) than for those who scored low on the CC subscale 
(indicating low belief in the possibility of false confessions occurring). 
5.3 Method 
This study tested whether the subscales on the ATCC were able to effectively predict 
how jurors would perceive suspect guilt when reading a confession manipulated for coercion 
and consistency.  Participants were asked to act as mock jurors and review confession 
evidence from a trial.   
5.3.1 Participants.  
One hundred and seventy-six participants (136 female) were recruited from the university 
campus and remunerated $15 or received partial course credit.  Participants ranged in age 
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from 18 to 63 years (M = 24.99, SD = 9.45), with 93.7% speaking English as their main 
language at home, and 88% studying at university on a full-time basis.  Participants were 
randomly allocated to one cell of a 2 (consistency) x 2 (voluntariness) between-groups 
factorial design.   
5.3.2 Procedure  
Testing took place in either a laboratory or classroom setting, with participants giving 
informed consent.  Participants read a confession transcript and then answered pen and paper 
questions in order.  Supervision by an experimenter ensured that participants did not discuss 
their responses, change their answers once given, nor read ahead at any time.  The ATCC 
scales were placed last in the test battery to ensure that their inclusion did not alter verdict 
questions or those relating to confession consistency and voluntariness.  Participants acted as 
individual mock-jurors, rather than as a juror deliberation exercise in order to ascertain their 
individual belief in suspect guilt.  Completion time for the task was approximately 25 
minutes. 
5.3.3 Stimulus materials 
Participants read one of four versions of a fictional transcript of a police interview in 
which a suspect confesses to a physical assault charge.  The transcripts were of the kind that 
might be produced by transcribing audio or video recordings to be presented in court. In the 
police interview, the suspect admits going to the victim’s house to purchase a used car, and 
later returning to (unsuccessfully) steal the money he had paid to the victim.  During a 
fruitless search of the house, he encounters the victim in the kitchen.  They struggle and she 
hits her head on the kitchen bench, leaving her bleeding and unconscious.  The suspect then 
flees.  In all versions of the transcript, the police officer states that the suspect has previously 
given a statement denying any involvement, but that they are being given another chance to 
tell their story and make any changes.   
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5.3.4 Consistency manipulation 
 In the inconsistent condition, the suspect’s version of events is questioned by the 
police officer when he deviates from his (unseen) previously given statement.  This prompts 
the suspect to alter his story on five occasions to align with his original interview.  In 
accordance with techniques used by Brewer and Hupfeld (2004), inconsistencies were 
constructed to indicate that the suspect was confused about the details, rather than 
deliberately untruthful. For example, the suspect states that he entered the house via the 
garage, but then corrects his response, saying that he forgot, and actually entered the property 
via the front door and exited through the garage.    
In the consistent condition, while the police interviewer makes it clear that the suspect 
is being interviewed for a second time, the suspect gives the same version of events that he 
gave in his previous statement, thereby providing a consistent confession.  
5.3.5 Voluntariness manipulation.  
Voluntariness was manipulated through the use of coercion by police investigators.  
In the coerced condition, the suspect remained silent when questioned about his involvement 
in the assault, and only confessed when the police officer used coercive interrogation 
techniques.  These techniques included suggesting that there was irrefutable evidence against 
the suspect (“I have plenty of evidence in this file, so I know you’re not telling the truth”), 
and that the suspect would be treated more favourably if they confessed (“it will look much 
better for you if you say what really happened and show some remorse”).  The police officer 
also used positive rapport in empathizing with the suspect’s role as carer for his mother, and 
convincing the suspect that he could leave when he confessed (“you can always change your 
statement later, OK?”).  In the voluntary condition, no coercion was used and the suspect 
confessed without prompting. 
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Copies of each version of the stimulus materials are available as Supporting 
Information online. 
5.3.6 Measures  
Participants were asked a number of case-related questions, including whether they 
found the suspect guilty or not guilty of the assault charge, and how confident they were in 
their verdict decision, from 1 (“not at all confident”) to 10 (“totally confident”).   Verdict and 
verdict confidence were combined to form a new dependent variable, called judgment of 
guilt, following the method outlined by Tenney et al. (2007).  Although our analyses focussed 
on this continuous measure of judgments of guilt, we also analysed our data using the 
dichotomous verdict measures (guilty or not guilty). In all cases, the pattern of results was 
unaltered by using the dichotomous measure.  
Manipulation checks of consistency and coercion asked participants to rate on a 10-
point scale how consistent they found the suspect’s evidence (very inconsistent, to totally 
consistent), and how voluntary they believed the suspect’s confession to be (totally 
involuntary, to totally voluntary).  The Attitudes to Coerced Confessions scale was completed 
as the final measure in the questionnaire, comprising 9 questions with responses scored on a 
5-point Likert scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Several participants did 
not complete both of the subscales; rather than exclude these participants entirely, their data 
were retained for analyses of measures they did complete.  
5.4 Results 
5.4.1 Experimental results 
Dichotomous verdicts of guilt 
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The majority of participants gave a guilty verdict (76.1%), with a significant 
difference between groups, n = 176, χ2 (3) = 31.34, p < .001.  Dichotomous verdicts by 
condition are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Dichotomous verdicts of guilt by condition 
 
 
N Not guilty Guilty 
Consistent    
- Voluntary 46 2 44 
- Coerced 42 11 31 
Inconsistent    
- Voluntary 44 9 35 
- Coerced 44 20 24 
 
Manipulation checks. The use of coercion and the presence of confession 
inconsistencies were clearly visible to participants, with checks indicating that manipulations 
of consistency and coercion were successful (see Table 2).  Consistent confessions were rated 
as significantly more consistent than inconsistent confessions, t (147.43) = 10.09, p <.001, d 
= 1.52.  Similarly, voluntary confessions were rated as significantly more voluntary than 
coerced confessions, t (166.12) = 7.95, p <.001, d = 1.19. 
 
Table 2. Manipulation checks of perceived confession consistency and perceived confession 
voluntariness 
 
 
N M (SD) 
Consistency check***   
- Consistent 88 5.94 (2.39) 
- Inconsistent 87 2.89 (1.52) 
Voluntariness check***   
- Voluntary 90 6.59 (2.69) 
- Coerced 86 3.73 (2.06) 
*** = significant to p < .001 
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Judgments of guilt. To test for a significant interaction between the effects of 
consistency and coercion on judgments of guilt, a 2 (consistency: consistent, inconsistent) x 2 
(voluntariness: voluntary, coerced) between-groups factorial ANOVA was performed on the 
DV (judgment of guilt). 
  There was a significant main effect of consistency on judgment of guilt, F (1, 176) = 
11.30, p = .001, d = .51, with participants who read an inconsistent confession judging the 
suspect as less guilty than participants who read a consistent confession. Voluntariness also 
had a significant effect on judgment of guilt, F (1, 176) = 9.64, p = .002, d =.47, with 
participants who read a coerced confession judging the suspect as less guilty than those who 
read a voluntary confession.  There was no interaction between consistency and 
voluntariness, F (1, 176) = .067, p = .796.   
 
 
Figure 1.  Judgment of guilt by confession consistency and confession voluntariness. 
Errors bars show 95% confidence intervals.  
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5.4.2 Factor analysis of the ATCC subscales  
An exploratory factor analysis of the two subscales of the ATCC yielded a factor 
structure very similar to that reported by Clark et al. (2010). As shown in Table 3, a 
comparison of the component loadings for the subscale items showed little difference 
between the two studies.  Thus, our data support Clark et al.’s conclusion that the subscales 
of the ATCC measures two distinct constructs, support for coercive interrogation tactics and 
openness to the possibility that innocent persons might falsely confess. 
 Internal consistency for the CI subscale matched that of the original study (α = .72) 
and internal consistency for the CC subscale in the current study (α = .81) was similar to that 
found in the original study (α = .78). The current findings showed the subscales to be 
similarly negatively correlated (r = -.21, p = .006), as in the original study (r = -.23, p < .01).  
Mean scores for the subscales differed somewhat between the current study and Clark 
et al. (2010).  The mean for the CI subscale was 2.35 (SD = .86) in the current study 
compared to 3.00 (SD = .98) in the original. However, participants in the original study 
scored lower on the CC subscale (M = 2.95, SD = .98) than in the current study (M = 4.13, 
SD = .75).  As the possible range of scores on the subscales is 1 to 5, the high CC subscale 
score in the current study indicates that, on average, participants were able to identify that 
false confessions can be coerced from innocent suspects.  This difference may be due to the 
participant samples, with the original study using jury pool members, while participants in 
the current study were recruited from the wider university community. We expand on this 
issue in the Discussion. 
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Table 3. Comparison of component loading for ATCC subscale items  
  Original study (N = 292) Current study (N = 176) 
 
Item 
 
Subscale and item description 
Coerced 
Confession 
Coercive 
Interrogation 
Coerced 
Confession 
Coercive 
Interrogation 
 
 
Coercive Interrogation items 
    
1 Police officers should be allowed to do whatever it takes to get criminal 
suspects to confess 
-.12 .65 -.11 .55 
2 Police officers should try to make interrogations uncomfortable for 
criminal suspects 
.03 .82 -.08 .78 
3 It is OK for police officers to lie to a suspect during an interrogation 
because a truly innocent person would not be influenced by the officer’s 
lie 
-.31 .65 -.09 .49 
5 Police officers should try to make interrogations stressful for subjects .07 .81 -.07 .71 
 
Coerced Confession items 
    
4 *An innocent person could be pressured by the police into confessing to a 
crime they did not commit 
.73 .08 .55 -.11 
6 I can see how people might confess to crimes they did not commit if it 
saved them from being charged with much more serious crimes 
.75 .02 .70 -.04 
7 I can see how people might confess to crimes they did not commit if they 
were threatened by the police 
.78 -.25 .78 -.16 
8 I can see how people might decide to confess to crimes they did not 
commit if a great deal of other evidence suggested they were guilty 
.73 -.09 .83 -.06 
9 Sometimes, people will confess to anything to stop a stressful interrogation .62 -.14 .55 -.11 
N = 176.  Loadings were extracted using principal axis factoring with varimax rotation and Kaiser normalization.  Values above criterion level (.40) are shown in bold. * The 
pronoun ‘he’ used in the original ATCC scale was changed to the neutral pronoun ‘they’ in the current study. 
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5.4.3 The predictive validity of the ATCC  
Before moving to our main tests of predictive validity, we note that our data 
replicated Clark et al.’s (2010) results regarding the predictive validity of the ATCC. As in 
Clark et al.’s results, judgments of the likely guilt of the suspect were positively correlated 
with scores on the CI subscale, r (169) = .25, p = .001, and negatively correlated with scores 
on the CC subscale, r (166) = -.30, p < .001. Thus, higher judgments of guilt were associated 
with greater support for coercive interrogation techniques and lower reported belief that 
innocent people might falsely confess to a crime. However, as noted in the Introduction, these 
results might simply reflect a tendency for people who score high on the CI subscale (and 
low on CC) to be harsh in delivering verdicts; hence, these data alone do not provide strong 
evidence of the validity of the ATCC. 
Moderation analyses.  The central analyses concerned the extent to which scores on 
the ATCC subscales moderated the effects of the voluntariness and inconsistency 
manipulations on judgments of guilt.  Moderation analyses were conducted using PROCESS 
(Hayes, 2013) to understand the conditions in which confession voluntariness and 
consistency would influence judgments of guilt.  Figures 2 and 3 are plotted slopes to show 
the effect of condition on judgements of guilt at -1SD (low), 0SD (medium), and 1SD (high) 
of the moderator. 
These analyses provided evidence that the CI subscale of the ATCC is a valid 
measure of support for coercive interrogation.  The relationship between confession 
voluntariness and judgments of guilt was moderated by support for coercive interrogation 
techniques, b = 2.65, 95% CI [.871, 4.429], t = 2.94, p = .004.  As shown in Figure 2, mock 
jurors with a low CI score (low in support for coercive tactics) gave significantly lower 
judgments of guilt when they read a coerced confession rather than a voluntary confession.  
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The voluntariness of the confession did not alter the judgment of guilt for mock jurors with 
high CI scores; in other words, among mock jurors who are supportive of coercive 
interrogation techniques, the presence of coercion had minimal effect on judgments of guilt. 
 
Figure 2. The relationship between confession voluntariness and judgments of guilt, 
moderated by score on the Coercive Interrogations subscale.  
 
Similarly, the effect of confession inconsistencies on judgments of guilt was 
moderated by the strength of belief in coerced confessions, b = -2.86, [-4.87, -.85], t = -2.80, 
p = .006.  As shown in Figure 3, among mock jurors with lower scores on the CC subscale 
(i.e., those with relatively little belief that confessions can be coerced from innocent 
suspects), the manipulation of inconsistencies had minimal effect on judgments of the 
suspect’s guilt. In contrast, among those with higher scores on the CC subscale (i.e., 
relatively high belief in coerced confessions), judgments of guilt were lower for confessions 
that contained inconsistencies than confessions that did not.  
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Figure 3. The relationship between confession consistency and judgments of guilt, 
moderated by score on the Coerced Confessions subscale. 
Exploratory moderated mediation analysis.  We conducted additional moderated 
mediation analyses to explore the mechanisms underpinning the moderating role of CI and 
CC scores on the effects of coercion and confession inconsistencies, respectively. These 
analyses were exploratory, rather than planned a priori. 
We first considered the moderating role played by CI scores. One plausible model 
(shown in Figure 4) holds that the presence of coercion causes participants to perceive 
confession evidence as given less voluntarily, but the extent to which this translates to 
reduced judgments of guilt depends on level of support for coercive interrogation techniques. 
For participants who oppose coercive techniques, perceiving a confession as less voluntary 
will likely lead to lower judgments of guilt. However, for participants who support coercive 
techniques, perceiving a confession as less voluntary will not necessarily lead to lower 
judgments of guilt. In other words, did some mock jurors in Kassin and Sukel’s (1997) 
‘harmless error’ experiment acknowledge the presence of coercion, but then ignore it because 
of their attitudes toward coercive interrogation techniques?   
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Figure 4. Moderated mediation model to test the mechanism by which support for 
coercive interrogation techniques (CI score) influences the effect of voluntariness of 
confessions on judgments of guilt. 
Moderated mediation analysis (using PROCESS model 14; Hayes, 2013) provided 
support for this model. Perceived voluntariness of the confession mediated the relationship 
between the presence of coercion in the interrogation, and judgments of guilt.  The presence 
of coercion lowered perceived confession voluntariness (the a path in Figure 4), b = -2.84 [-
3.56, -2.11], p < .001. In turn, perceived voluntariness lowered judgments of guilt (b path), b 
= 0.83 [0.54, 1.13], p < .001, with a significant indirect effect of coercion on judgments of 
guilt (ab path), b = -2.37 [-2.66, -1.46].   
Importantly, the relationship between perceived voluntariness and judgments of guilt 
(b path) was moderated by mean CI scores, b = -0.47 [-0.76, -0.18], p = .002. Lower 
perceived voluntariness was associated with lower judgments of guilt, but as support for 
coercive interrogation techniques went up, the relationship between perceived voluntariness 
and judgments of guilt became weaker.  Hence, for participants who reported relatively low 
support for coercive techniques, lower perception that a confession had been given 
voluntarily reduced judgments of guilt, b = -3.51 [-5.02, -2.47]. In contrast, for those who 
reported supporting coercive techniques, lower perception that a confession had not been 
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given voluntarily had little effect on their judgment of the suspect’s guilt, b = -1.22 [-2.66, 
0.12].  This finding may help explain why some people state that they ignore a confession, 
but still take that confession into account when making their verdict decision (e.g., Kassin & 
Sukel, 1997). 
It should be noted that scores on the CI and CC provided weak, non-significant 
correlations with perceived confession consistency and perceived confession voluntariness 
(see Table 4).  Therefore, any moderating effects cannot be explained by a differential 
capacity to detect problems in the confession.   
Table 4. Correlational relationship between scores on the ATCC and manipulation 
checks  
 
 
 Consistency Check Voluntariness 
check 
Mean CI Pearson 
correlation 
-.04 .13 
 Sig. .60 .09 
 N 170 171 
Mean CC Pearson 
correlation 
.00 -.14 
 Sig. .98 .06 
 N 167 168 
 
Next, we considered the moderating role of CC scores in the relationship between 
confession inconsistencies and judgments of guilt. If sometimes inconsistencies are of 
concern to jurors, and sometimes not (e.g., Henderson & Levett, 2016; Malloy & Lamb, 
2016; Palmer et al., 2016; Woestehoff & Meissner, 2016), then the question is raised as to 
whether confession inconsistencies are perceived differently according to attitudes toward 
coerced confessions. This could occur even if those attitudes do not alter the actual ability to 
perceive whether a confession has been given consistently or not. Thus, inconsistencies in 
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confession evidence might reduce mock jurors’ perceptions of consistency, but this might 
translate to reduced judgments of guilt only for participants who are open to the idea that 
innocent people sometimes falsely confess (i.e., those who score high on the CC subscale).  
We tested this idea using moderated mediated analysis (PROCESS model 14; Hayes, 
2013) as shown in Figure 5. Perceived consistency of the confession was the mechanism by 
which confession consistency influenced judgments of guilt.  The presence of confession 
inconsistencies reduced perceived confession consistency (a path), b = -3.14 [-3.76, -2.52], p 
< .001.  As the perceived consistency of the confession reduced, judgments of guilt also 
reduced (b path), b = 0.57 [0.20, 0.94], p = .003.  The significant indirect effect of 
inconsistencies on judgments of guilt (ab path) confirms that confession errors overall 
reduced judgments of guilt by decreasing perceived consistency, b = -1.78 [-2.99, -0.57]. 
However, contrary to the model we tested, openness to the idea that innocent people might 
confess (scores on the CC subscale) did not moderate the relationship between perceived 
consistency and judgments of guilt, b = 0.23 [-0.18, 0.63], p = .267. 
 
Figure 5. Moderated mediation model to test the mechanism by which openness to the idea 
that innocent people might falsely confess (CC score) influences the effect of confession 
inconsistencies on judgments of guilt. 
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5.5 Discussion 
The results of this study show that the ATCC is able to predict which jurors are likely 
to reduce their judgment of suspect guilt when presented with an inconsistent or coerced 
confession, and those who will not, and can also help explain the mechanism behind this 
variance.  
5.5.1 Validity and reliability of the ATCC subscales 
Comparison with previous study. Tests of reliability and validity confirmed the 
findings of the original scale developers.  The ATCC was found to be a reliable measure of 
juror attitudes toward coerced confessions, which could successfully predict how mock jurors 
would perceive suspect guilt when presented with confession evidence.  While the original 
authors (Clark et al., 2010) had tested belief in suspect guilt using descriptions of recanted 
confession cases from the Innocence Project, they called for researchers to test the scale using 
more complex materials.  The current study used transcripts of police interviews in which a 
suspect confessed to an attempted robbery and assault and found the ATCC was robust across 
the different mediums, with scores on the subscales able to predict judgments of guilt when 
participants read confessions that contained inconsistencies or had been gained by coercion.   
As hypothesised, the ATCC subscales were equally able to predict systematic 
variation in the effects of relevant factors on judgments of guilt.   First, the current study 
confirms that the CI subscale can successfully predict whether a juror will consider the 
influence of coercion when making their verdict decisions.  Using results on the CI subscale 
we can predict that jurors who are highly supportive of coercive interrogation techniques will 
dismiss instances of police coercion when assessing the veracity of the confession.  
Therefore, jurors who have high scores on the CI view confessions equally, regardless of 
confession quality in terms of coercion.  However, a juror who does not believe that the 
police should have the power to extract confessions using coercion will be more likely to 
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attribute the suspect’s confession to a reason other than guilt and judge them as less guilty 
than a suspect who gives a consistent confession.   
Second, the CC subscale successfully measured whether participants believed that 
confessions could be coerced from innocent parties.  Mock jurors who had high belief in the 
existence of coerced confessions, judged a suspect who gave an inconsistent confession as 
less guilty of the crime than a suspect who gave a consistent confession.  This effect was not 
seen in those who had low belief in coerced confessions.  The divergent direction of 
judgments of guilt between the low and high belief in coerced confession groups might be 
due to different attributions regarding the reasons for the inconsistencies.  For example, if a 
person understands that false confessions are a real phenomenon, they might perceive the 
inconsistencies as an indication that the suspect is innocent and unfamiliar with the facts of 
the crime.  However, if a person assumes that only guilty people confess, then the 
inconsistencies might be seen as a sign that the suspect is being purposely inconsistent, and 
have no effect their belief in the suspect’s guilt. 
We also considered the possibility that participants might have ‘selective vision’ 
when it came to perceiving confession voluntariness or confession inconsistencies, dependent 
on their CI or CC level.  However, this was not the case scores, with subscale scores not 
related to perceptions of confession voluntariness or confession consistency.  Specifically, 
and with regards to CI, these findings suggest that support for coercive interrogation 
techniques functions independently of the ability to recognise whether an interrogator has 
used coercive techniques to aid in the suspect confessing.  That is, being wary of the use of 
coercive interrogation practices does not make you any better at detecting them in a 
confession, just as being supportive of coercive interview techniques, does not make you 
unobservant of their presence.  Rather, support or rejection of the use of coercion as an 
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acceptable interrogation method will alter juror perception of the validity of the evidence 
when making their verdict decisions.   
The ATCC also provides the benefit of testing whether individual attitudes can 
influence perception of suspect guilt, even when they should not.  For example, some people 
might be predisposed to acquit rather than convict, even if the confession should reasonably 
have been accepted.  This was a concern not addressed by Clark et al.’s (2010) results; 
because the presence of coercion (or other aspects of confession quality) was not 
manipulated, those results left open the possibility that scores on the ATCC subscales merely 
reflect willingness to convict based on a confession. Our findings showed that all 
participants, whether low or high on the CI and CC subscales, assessed confession evidence 
that appeared to be accurately and truthfully given (i.e., contained no coercion, no 
inconsistencies) as highly indicative of suspect guilt.  That mock jurors were able to 
successfully identify which of the confessions was likely to be true, without being 
inappropriately influenced by their overall belief in coerced confessions, is an indication that 
providing jurors with access to transcripts has only positive benefits. 
This is further evidence that the push for videotaped interrogations is likely to reduce 
wrongful convictions based on false confessions.  Not only does video-recording confessions 
reduce the use of police coercion in the first place (Kassin, Kukucka, Lawson, & DeCarlo, 
2014), but jurors also benefit from being able to see how an interrogation has unfolded, and 
whether the confession has been gained by coercion or contains inconsistencies.  A concern is 
always that some people have a preferred verdict regardless of the content of the actual 
confession provided, however the ATCC has shown that these two particular attitudes do not 
color juror judgments in regards to true confession, but only those that contain problematic 
elements that might indicate that the confession is false.   
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Although not the main focus of this research, we note that the results replicate the 
findings of Palmer et al. (2016), who found that inconsistencies in confession evidence 
reduced guilty verdicts, regardless of whether police coercion was used or not.  These 
findings appear to contradict the raft of false confession cases where jurors convicted on 
confessions that were both inconsistent and coerced, and is further indication that jurors have 
variable beliefs about what constitutes valid confession evidence.  Palmer et al.’s study used 
simple confession statements as evidence stimuli; our study extends their findings by 
replicating their results using police interview transcripts, which contain more detail than 
simple confession statements and, hence, offer more scope for participants to overlook 
inconsistencies or evidence of coercion.  Together, these and other recent results (e.g., 
Henderson & Levett, 2016; Woestehoff & Meissner, 2016) point to the optimistic possibility 
that jurors may be more discerning in their processing of confession evidence than previously 
assumed. 
5.5.2 Limitations 
However, despite the general concurrence of overall findings between the original and 
current studies, there was one notable difference.  Clark et al., (2010) called for their scale to 
be tested among different populations, which has been achieved.  However, while student 
scores on the CI subscale did not differ substantially from the original authors’ jury pool 
sample, the same cannot be said of the median score on the CC subscale. The median score 
on the CC subscale was higher for the current study than the original study, and sat near the 
top of possible scores in the range.  This may have resulted in the non-significant results 
when testing the moderated relationship between perceived confession consistency and 
judgments of guilt, as there may have been a restricted range of scores in the moderator 
variable (Mean CC).  The current study recruited undergraduate students and members of the 
wider university community, while the original study accessed members of a jury pool that 
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had been summoned for jury.  The CC subscale measures how strongly a person believes that 
a confession can be coerced from an innocent person, which is a concept that people in 
general have difficulty understanding (Leo & Ofshe, 1998).  While we have no particular 
evidence to back up this theory, psychology students might be more amenable to the 
theoretical concept of false confessions than members of the general public, having been 
exposed to social psychological theories explaining why people sometimes behave in ways 
that are difficult to understand.   
5.5.3 Summary 
The current study supported the predictive validity of the ATCC scale through 
experimental testing using confession transcripts manipulated for consistency and 
voluntariness.  Three key findings from this study may help explain why jurors sometimes 
ignore confession inconsistencies and evidence of coercion, and sometimes do not. 
First, the current study shows that a person’s belief in coerced confessions or support 
for coercive interrogation techniques will not alter their ability to see whether a confession 
contains inconsistencies or was gained using coercion, nor do they alter their judgments of a 
truthfully given confession.  Therefore, juror variation in judging guilt based on problematic 
confession evidence is not due to varying inability to see the problems in the confession, or a 
general propensity towards conservative judgments of guilt.  Second, a person’s score on the 
relevant subscale (CI or CC) moderated the strength of the relationship between the related 
problem in the confession (inconsistencies, or coercion) on judgments of suspect guilt.  
Therefore, coercion in a confession affects judgments of guilt differentially, dependent on 
how strongly a juror supports coercive interrogations and how much they believe that 
confessions can be coerced from innocent suspects. Finally, scores on the CI scale further 
moderated the strength of the influence that perception of confession voluntariness had on 
judgments of guilt.  That is, a juror’s support for coercive interrogations will moderate the 
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strength of influence that perceived confession voluntariness will have when making 
judgments of guilt. 
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6.1 Overview of Thesis Aims and Outcomes 
False confessions contribute to a significant proportion of wrongful convictions later 
exonerated courtesy of DNA evidence.  While some false confessions might be 
indistinguishable from true confessions, others are of such low quality that it is difficult, in 
hindsight, to understand how the jury accepted them as a credible piece of evidence (and 
often in the absence of any other evidence).   
The overall aim of this thesis was to contribute to existing psychological literature on 
how jurors process confession evidence, and further investigate the circumstances under 
which jurors are more likely to discount confession evidence when considering a suspect’s 
guilt.  The catalyst for the investigating this topic was emerging research suggesting that 
people can sometimes be better at recognizing and discounting inconsistent confessions than 
wrongful conviction statistics might suggest (Henderson & Levett, 2016; Palmer et al., 
2016; Woestehoff & Meissner, 2016).  As this suggestion runs counter to the overwhelming 
case evidence that jurors are quick to accept any confession as true, we first aimed to test 
whether jurors would, in the pre-deliberation phase, be able to a) discern whether a 
confession was inconsistent or not, and b) adjust their belief in the suspect’s guilt 
accordingly.  Two empirical studies were designed to answer these questions using 
simplified, but realistic, trial materials that varied both the types of inconsistencies made in 
the confession (i.e. contradictions or factual errors), and whether the influence of the 
inconsistencies depended on the direction of their difference to the facts of the crime (i.e. 
making the confessor look better or worse). 
A further two empirical studies aimed to provide methodological contributions to 
confession literature by testing whether two existing scales could identify individual juror 
attributes that might moderate how individuals perceive suspect guilt based on inconsistent 
confession evidence.  We tested the first measure, Need for Cognition, in response to 
contradictory findings in previous literature as to whether an individual’s desire to pursue 
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complex and intellectually engaging task moderated juror decisions.  Next we tested the 
previously untested Attitudes Toward Coerced Confessions scale, to assess whether it could 
be used to successfully differentiate individuals according to how much they supported 
coercive interrogation tactics, and how strongly they believed that confessions could be 
coerced from innocent people.  
A summary of the key empirical findings from these studies is provided in the 
following sections.  Discussion includes methodological and theoretical implications, 
limitations and directions for future studies.  A flowchart of empirical tests conducted in this 
thesis is shown below (Figure 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Factors potentially contributing to variance in juror processing of 
confession evidence. Flowchart of empirical tests. 
Contradictions 
(Chapter 2) 
Confession 
attributes 
Factual Errors 
(Chapter 2) 
Directional Errors 
(Chapter 3) 
Judgments of guilt 
Need for 
Cognition 
(Chapter 4) 
Juror attributes 
Attitudes Toward 
Coerced 
Confessions 
(Chapter 5) 
Judgments of guilt 
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6.2 Key Empirical Findings and Implications of the Thesis 
6.2.1 Juror sensitivity to confession inconsistencies 
One suggestion as to why jurors might accept false confession evidence is that they 
may be insensitive to the existence of inconsistencies in confession evidence (Malloy & 
Lamb, 2010), and therefore would not take confession consistency into account when 
making verdict decisions.  However, a key finding in each of the four experiments in the 
current series is that jurors are able to discern inconsistencies in confession evidence and, 
therefore, their acceptance of inconsistent confession evidence is not because they are 
unaware of the inconsistencies.  
This overall finding suggests that the overwhelming believability of confessions 
does not actually prevent jurors from noticing confession inconsistencies.  Instead, if a juror 
is faced with an inconsistent confession, they will either attribute the inconsistencies in a 
way that confirms their assumption of guilt, or they will reduce their belief in the confession 
and look for alternate reasons why the suspect might be confessing.   
6.2.2. Differential weighting of confession inconsistencies 
While we found that jurors are overwhelmingly capable of noticing false 
confessions, our findings suggest that people do not weight confession inconsistencies 
equally when making their decision.  In Chapter 2 we described two experiments that 
studied the effect of different types of inconsistencies.  In the first experiment, we found that 
when the suspect contradicted his own testimony and then self-corrected the contradictions, 
judgments of guilt did not reduce in comparison to a consistent confession.  A second 
experiment was conducted to test the effect of factual errors on judgments of guilt, where 
participants were able to compare the confession transcript to a police report to ascertain the 
factual accuracy of the confession.  Participants significantly reduced judgments of guilt for 
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suspects who gave factually inaccurate confessions, compared to suspects who gave 
accurate confessions.  The differential treatment of confessions by inconsistency type may 
provide reason why we see variability in whether jurors accept or reject false confessions–
factual errors may raise juror concern of confession veracity in a way that contradictions do 
not.   
The finding that factual errors in a confession reduced judgments of guilt, while 
contradictions did not, prompted a second experiment (presented in Chapter 3) which 
questioned whether the effect of factual errors would be altered if the suspect appeared to be 
increasing or decreasing the severity of the accused crime.  The justification for this research 
lies in the popularity of certain police interrogation practices (i.e. minimization and 
maximization) which could reasonably be related to whether an innocent person confessing 
might accidentally overstate or understate the facts of the crime in accordance with the 
emphasis used by the police.  This study aimed to test whether jurors might form individual 
beliefs about the suspect’s behavior (i.e. why they were exaggerating or downplaying the 
crime) based on perceived ulterior motives.  Consistent with the findings of the effect of 
factual errors in Chapter 2, reduced perception of confession consistency resulted in reduced 
belief in suspect guilt.  However, there was no direct effect of confession consistency on 
judgments of guilt when the consistent confession was compared to a confession where the 
suspect had exaggerated the facts of the crime (rendering an inconsistent confession).  When 
the accurate confession was compared to a confession where the suspect admitted to a lesser 
version of the crime, inconsistencies acted to increase belief in suspect guilt.  Therefore, 
while factual errors will in general reduce the perceived quality of the confession and in turn 
reduce judgments of guilt, this effect does not apply neatly to instances when the 
inconsistencies relate to measurable quantities that act to amplify or minimize the crime 
severity.  For example, an error that relates to the time of day that a crime occurred might 
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relate to overall confession credibility, but is unlikely to increase or decrease the severity of 
the crime.  However, admitting to stealing a smaller amount of money or inflicting a larger 
number of wounds does alter the magnitude of the confessed crime, and the results shown in 
Chapter 3 indicate that individuals are unlikely to dismiss the confession if the 
inconsistencies are skewed either for or against the defendant, and that this may relate to the 
ulterior motive attributed to the suspect’s behavior (i.e. why they have incorrectly stated the 
facts of the crime). 
Despite the finding that jurors are capable of identifying issues in confession quality, 
and discounting the confession accordingly, the majority of participants in our studies still 
judged the suspect as guilty, when asked to give a dichotomous verdict of guilt.  This fits 
with both case evidence of wrongful convictions in which incorrect confessions were 
overwhelmingly accepted by juries (Drizin & Leo, 2004), and experimental studies where 
mock-jurors were still influenced by confessions they claim to have rejected when making 
their verdict decision (Kassin & Sukel, 1997).   
6.2.3 The role of need for cognition in assessing confession evidence  
Need for cognition is the measurable desire to seek out and engage in complex and 
intellectually challenging tasks (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). Need for cognition is a logical 
moderator for juror decision making, especially in the context of decisions that involve the 
processing of inconsistent evidence.  It is reasonable to think that jurors who seek out and 
enjoy engaging in complex tasks might be better equipped to scrutinize confession evidence 
than their counterparts with lower need for cognition.  However, confession evidence suffers 
from the paradox of appearing to need little engagement due to the underlying belief that 
only guilty people confess.  Our findings reflect this assumption of guilt, with null results 
across all four studies indicating no systematic difference of motivation to engage with the 
confession evidence across different need for cognition levels.  Previous research also 
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suggests that motivation might be the key component in need for cognition, with jurors 
having naturally inflated motivation to engage in a trial, temporarily equalizing need for 
cognition levels (see Kassin et al., 1990).  We conclude that personal characteristics of 
jurors may account for the variance in acceptance or rejection of inconsistent confession 
evidence, but that need for cognition is not one such characteristic. 
6.2.4 The role of attitudes toward coerced confessions in juror assessment of guilt  
While jurors in our studies were not influenced by need for cognition in assessing 
inconsistent confession evidence, they were influenced by their attitudes toward coerced 
confession.  Chapter 5 outlined the first independent test of the two subscales of the 
Attitudes Toward Coerced Confession scale (Clark et al., 2010), in which mock jurors read a 
confession manipulated to contain coercion and inconsistent elements.  We found that these 
attitudes had a moderating effect on the strength of the relationship between the confession 
and the jurors belief in the suspect’s guilt.  That is, jurors who strongly supported coercive 
interrogation techniques did not reduce their belief in the suspect’s guilt when presented 
with a coerced confession.  Similarly, jurors who had strong belief that innocent people 
could be forced to confess, had lower belief in the suspect’s guilt when presented with an 
inconsistent confession, than jurors who did not think false confessions were possible.  
These findings contribute to the growing body of literature that collectively aims to 
understand the variance in juror decisions with regards to false confession evidence. 
6.3 Theoretical Implications 
The present thesis challenges the idea that jurors will automatically accept any 
confession to be true, and presents a number of theoretical reasons as to why this belief may 
be oversimplifying a complex problem.  Attribution theory (Kelley, 1973), and the role of 
suspicion in particular (Fein et al., 1990), provides a relevant framework for juror decision 
making, and the current series of studies allowed us to theorize how jurors might attribute 
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the reason behind an inconsistent confession, dependent on the type of inconsistencies 
present.  We found that, rather than simply attributing all confessions to guilt, jurors were 
motivated to generate alternate reasons why the suspect had confessed, if the confession 
provided some indication that it may have been falsely given.  Chapters 2 describes studies 
where the ways that jurors could attribute the reason behind the confession inconsistencies, 
varied by inconsistency type.  The results reflect the relative ease of contemplating why a 
guilty suspect might contradict himself in his confession, versus the relative difficulty of 
generating a plausible reason for a suspect who cannot correctly recount key facts of the 
case. 
The study described in Chapter 3 makes a theoretical contribution to the story model 
of juror decision-making (Pennington & Hastie, 1986), where jurors create internal 
narratives about the crime, and then adapt that narrative to accommodate new evidence and 
information.  The study of the effect of directional errors on juror decisions supports the 
notion that jurors’ internal narratives also adapt to include information that has not been 
implicitly provided in the evidence, such as the confessor’s motivation.  When the errors in 
the confession made the suspect appear to be lessening the severity of the crime, jurors had 
increased perception of the suspect’s guilt in the crime.  Verbatim responses confirmed that 
the increased perception of guilt was due to the belief that the suspect was motivated to 
deliberately downplay his involvement in the crime in order to attract a lesser penalty.   
Individual personality characteristics have been theorized to have a role in juror 
decision making.  While a greater need for cognition did not result in any greater scrutiny of 
confession evidence, individual attitudes towards the phenomenon of false confessions did 
influence how inconsistent and coerced confessions were processed.  In particular, the study 
outlined in Chapter 5 indicates that individual support for coercive interrogation techniques 
does not reduce their capacity to understand that the techniques used are coercive.  Instead, 
the individual supportive of coercion simply believes that the confession is still valid.  This 
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speaks directly to how juries can come to accept blatantly coerced confessions as evidence 
of guilt.  Similarly, the findings showed that jurors who can understand that false 
confessions occur, are no more likely to see that a confession is inconsistent, but are more 
likely to have a lower perception of suspect guilt due to the inconsistencies in the 
confession. 
6.4 Methodological Limitations 
6.4.1. Ecological validity 
The key limitation of the study design utilised in Chapters 2 and 3 is that, by 
focusing on pre-deliberation confidence in guilt of individual jurors, the methodology fails 
to provide a direct understanding of why juries will convict based on false confession 
evidence.  While it is important to understand the initial sentiment of jurors when faced with 
inconsistent confession evidence, juries do make group decisions, either in the majority or 
unanimously, and the present studies do not address how individual decisions affect and are 
affected by the deliberation process.  Notwithstanding this limitation of direct 
generalizability, the results of these two studies provide evidence that individual jurors are 
capable of discerning confession inconsistencies, and are sometimes influenced to suppress 
the heuristic that only guilty people confess.  Future research might study the robustness of 
the effect of factual errors on judgments of guilt when presented with competing pieces of 
evidence, and after undergoing the process of group deliberation. 
In terms of the overall argument about ecological validity in juror studies, we would 
like to address some key aspects that are likely to be a concern to readers (some of which 
have also been noted in previous chapters).  Juror experiments are commonly criticized for 
lacking generalizability, as they generally use student samples (often predominantly female, 
as is the case in the present studies) and do not sufficiently replicate the complexity and 
nuance of a court case.  These are valid concerns, and a considerable amount of research has 
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explored the differences between student and community samples in mock-juror studies.  
Most undergraduate students are jury-eligible, and therefore a part of the sample we are 
aiming to test.  Findings have generally supported the idea that students provide an adequate 
sample for mock-juror studies.  Devine and Caughlin (2014) conducted a meta-analysis 
involving four participant types: students, community members, venire persons (people who 
had shown up for jury duty, but not participated), and a mixed group.  They found that 
participant type did not significantly moderate the relationship between juror characteristics 
(e.g. authoritarianism, need for cognition) and verdict outcomes (either dichotomous or 
continuous measure of guilt).  However, we do acknowledge that there may be 
circumstances under which participant type may provide an unwitting confound, and that 
future research may wish to recruit participants with more diversity of race and gender. 
6.4.2 Continuous vs dichotomous measures 
 Juries, made up of individual jurors, are required to return a verdict as to whether 
they find the suspect guilty or not guilty of the alleged crime.  Jurors will have come to their 
own belief in the suspect’s guilt prior to deliberation, even if that belief is ameliorated in the 
deliberation process.  When investigating why juries sometimes accept false confession 
evidence, we are ultimately asking why individual jurors accept false confession evidence.  
In order to answer this question successfully, we need to investigate not only what a juror’s 
ultimate verdict would be, but how strongly they believe in that verdict.  To measure this 
strength in belief we ask jurors to give a verdict decision (which increases verisimilitude) 
and then rate their confidence, then combine these two measures.  Although dichotomous 
verdicts might be used in court, the combined measure provides a clearer picture of the pre-
verdict decision making process, which accounts for the popularity of the continuous 
measure in juror decision-making research.  There is evidence to show that continuous 
measures of guilt do not result in overstated findings about the effect of juror characteristics 
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on verdict outcomes.  Devine and Caughlin (2014) found that a meta-analysis of juror 
studies showed that continuous measures of guilt produced slightly more conservative 
observed effects than dichotomous verdicts, when testing the relationship between juror 
characteristics and suspect guilt.  However, as the use of continuous measures is an ongoing 
criticism of juror studies, future research could investigate different ways of mapping juror 
beliefs onto dichotomous juror verdicts. 
6.5 Directions for Future Research 
The results of the studies described in this thesis have helped to explain a small 
portion of the variance in individual juror decision-making when presented with inconsistent 
confession evidence.  Future research should test the robustness of these findings in a more 
cognitively demanding situation (such as with a volume of competing trial evidence), and 
further in a group deliberation setting.  Group deliberation might well erode any variance 
shown in the early decisions of individual jurors, which may help explain why juries 
continue to accept false confession evidence in court. 
6.5.1 Media coverage and the evolving juror 
Recent research into juror processing of confession evidence suggests that jurors are 
becoming less naïve about the possibility of false confessions (Woestehoff & Meissner, 
2016).  This may be linked to the recent string of high budget false confession 
documentaries that have captured the public’s attention.  Making a Murderer: the Brendan 
Dassey story, Amanda Knox, and the recently released Confession Tapes have provided the 
in-depth, extended format needed to educate people about how false confessions occur, and 
how they are almost impossible to retract.  While there is no exact way of measuring the 
impact of such shows, the greater dispersal of information about the factors that contribute 
to false confessions may certainly be contributing to a more educated jury.  Future research 
might look at the influence of popular media on people’s attitudes towards confession 
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evidence, to see if watching these shows makes people better at evaluating confessions (i.e. 
more sensitive to manipulations of confession quality), or just less likely to think the person 
is guilty. 
6.6 Conclusions 
The present thesis aimed to test the circumstances under which individuals would be 
more discerning about the quality and credibility of confession evidence.  The research 
described in this thesis provides evidence that individual jurors are able to detect 
inconsistencies in confession evidence, and that some types of inconsistencies may prompt a 
lower confidence in the suspect’s guilt.  The differential effect of confession attributes adds 
weight to the argument that interrogations must be recorded fully, as jurors can only assess 
credibility based on confession consistency if the transcript is sufficiently complete as to 
provide points of comparison for checking for inconsistencies.  Additionally, the research 
indicates that while some juror characteristics do not appear to moderate juror belief in 
suspect guilt when viewing an inconsistent confession (i.e. need for cognition), that other 
individual characteristics can isolate which individuals are likely to accept a coerced 
confession or deny that a confession could be coerced from an innocent person.   
131 
  
 
References 
Appleby, S. C., Hasel, L. E., & Kassin, S. M. (2013). Police-induced confessions: An 
empirical analysis of their content and impact. Psychology, Crime and Law, 19(2), 
111-128. doi:10.1080/1068316x.2011.613389 
Appleby, S. C., & Kassin, S. M. (2016). When self-report trumps science: Effects of 
confessions, DNA and prosecutorial theories on perceptions of guilt. Psychology, 
Public Policy, and Law, 22(2), 127-140. doi:10.1037/law0000080 
Boehm, V. R. (1968). Mr. prejudice, miss sympathy, and the authoritarian personality: An 
application of psychological measuring techniques to the problem of jury bias. 
Wisconsin Law Review, 3, 734-750.  
Bond, C. F., & DePaulo, B. M. (2006). Accuracy of deception judgments. Personality and 
Social Psychology Review, 10(3), 214-234. doi:10.1207/s15327957pspr1003_2 
Brewer, N., & Hupfeld, R. M. (2004). Effects of testimonial inconsistencies and witness 
group identity on mock-juror judgments. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 
34(3), 493-513. doi:10.1111/j.1559-1816.2004.tb02558.x 
Cacioppo, J. T., & Petty, R. E. (1982). The need for cognition. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 42(1), 116-131. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-
3514.42.1.116 
Cacioppo, J. T., Petty, R. E., & Kao, C. F. (1984). The efficient assessment of Need for 
Cognition. Journal of Personality Assessment, 48(3), 306-307.  
Clark, J. W., Boccaccini, M. T., & Turner, D. (2010). Attitudes towards coerced 
confessions: Psychometric properties of new and existing measures in jury pool 
samples. The Southwest Journal of Criminal Justice, 6(3), 185-203.  
Crocker, C. B., & Kovera, M. B. (2011). Systematic jury selection. In R. L. Wiener & B. H. 
Bornstein (Eds.), Handbook of Trial Consulting (pp. 13-31): Springer Science. 
Devine, D. J., & Caughlin, D. (2014). Do they matter? A meta-analytic investigation of 
individual characteristics and guilt judgments. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 
20(2), 109-134. doi:10.1037/law0000006 
Drizin, S. A., & Leo, R. A. (2004). The problem of false confessions in the post-DNA 
world. The North Carolina Law Review(82), 891-1008.  
Edmond, G., Tangen, J. M., Searston, R. A., & Dror, I. E. (2015). Contextual bias and cross-
contamination in the forensic sciences: the corrosive implications for investigations, 
plea bargains, trials and appels. Law, Probability and Risk, 14, 1-25. 
doi:10.1093/lpr/mgu018 
Fein, S. (1996). Effects of suspicion on attributional thinking and the correspondence bias. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70(6), 1164-1184. doi:10.1037/0022-
3514.70.6.1164 
Fein, S., Hilton, J. L., & Miller, D. T. (1990). Suspicion of ulterior motivation and the 
correspondence bias. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 58(5), 753-764. 
doi:10.1037//0022-3514.58.5.753 
Fein, S., McCloskey, A. L., & Tomlinson, T. M. (1997). Can the Jury Disregard that 
Information? The Use of Suspicion to Reduce the Prejudicial Effects of Pretrial 
Publicity and Inadmissible Testimony. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 
23(11), 1215-1226. doi:10.1177/01461672972311008 
Fein, S., Morgan, S. J., Norton, M. I., & Sommers, S. R. (1997). Hype and suspicion: The 
effects of pretrial publicity, race, and suspicion on jurors' verdicts. Journal of Social 
Issues, 53(3), 487-502. doi:10.1111/j.1540-4560.1997.tb02124.x 
132 
  
Garrett, B. L. (2010). The substance of false confessions. Stanford Law Review, 62(4), 
1051-1118.  
Gilbert, D. T., & Malone, P. S. (1995). The correspondence bias. Psychological Bulletin, 
117, 21-38. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.117.1.21 
Gudjonsson, G. H. (1999). The making of a serial false confessor: The confessions of Henry 
Lee Lucas. The Journal of Forensic Psychiatry, 10(2), 416-426. 
doi:10.1080/09585189908403693 
Hasel, L. E., & Kassin, S. M. (2009). On the presumption of evidentiary independence: Can 
confessions corrupt eyewitness identifications? Psychological Science, 20(1), 122-
126. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02262.x 
Hayes, A. F. (2013). Introduction to Mediation, Moderation, and Conditional Process 
Analysis: A Regression-Based Approach. New York: The Guildford Press. 
Henderson, K. S., & Levett, L. M. (2016). Can expert testimony sensitize jurors to 
variations in confession evidence? Law and Human Behavior, 40(6), 638-649. 
doi:10.1037/lhb0000204 
Henkel, L. A., Coffman, K. A. J., & Dailey, B. A. E. M. (2008). A survey of people's 
attitudes and beliefs about false confessions. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 26(5), 
555-584. doi:10.1002/bsl.826 
Horgan, A. J., Russano, M. B., Meissner, C. A., & Evans, J. R. (2012). Minimization and 
maximization techniques: assessing the perceived consequences of confessing and 
confession diagnosticity. Psychology, Crime & Law, 18(1), 65-78. 
doi:10.1080/1068316x.2011.561801 
Innocence Project. (2017).   Retrieved from http://www.innocenceproject.org/causes/false-
confessions-admissions/ 
Jones, E. E., & Davis, K. E. (1965). From acts to dispositions: The attribution process in 
person perception. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 2, 219-266. 
doi:10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60107-0 
Kassin, S. M. (1997). The psychology of confession evidence. American Psychologist, 52, 
221-233. doi:10.1037/0003-066X.52.3.221 
Kassin, S. M. (2008). False confessions: Causes, consequences, and implications for reform. 
Current Directions in Psychological Science, 17(4), 249-253. doi:10.1111/j.1467-
8721.2008.00584.x 
Kassin, S. M. (2012). Why confessions trump innocence. American Psychologist, 67(6), 
431-445. doi:10.1037/a0028212 
Kassin, S. M., Drizin, S. A., Grisso, T., Gudjonsson, G. H., Leo, R. A., & Redlich, A. D. 
(2010). Police-induced confessions, risk factors and recommendations: Looking 
ahead. Law and Human Behavior, 34(1), 49-52. doi:10.1007/s10979-010-9217-5 
Kassin, S. M., Dror, I. E., & Kukucka, J. (2013). The forensic confirmation bias: Problems, 
perspectives, and proposed solutions. Journal of Applied Research in Memory and 
Cognition, 2, 42-52. doi:10.1016/j.jarmac.2013.01.001 
Kassin, S. M., Kukucka, J., Lawson, V. Z., & DeCarlo, J. (2014). Does Video Recording 
Alter the Behavior of Police During Interrogation? A Mock Crime-and-Investigation 
Study. Law and Human Behavior, 38(1), 73-83. doi:Doi 10.1037/Lhb0000047 
Kassin, S. M., Meissner, C. A., & Norwick, R. J. (2005). 'I'd know a false confession if I 
saw one': A comparitive study of college students and police investigators. Law and 
Human Behavior, 29(2), 211-227. doi:10.1007/s10979-005-2416-9 
Kassin, S. M., & Neumann, K. (1997). On the power of confession evidence: An 
experimental test of the fundamental difference hypothesis. Law and Human 
Behavior, 21(5), 469-484. doi:10.1023/A:1024871622490 
Kassin, S. M., Reddy, M. E., & Tulloch, W. F. (1990). Juror interpretations of ambiguous 
evidence: The Need for Cognition, presentation order, and persuasion. Law and 
Human Behavior, 14(1), 43-55.  
133 
  
Kassin, S. M., & Sukel, H. (1997). Coerced confessions and the jury: An experimental test 
of the "harmless error" rule. Law and Human Behavior, 21(1), 27-46. 
doi:10.1023/A:1024814009769 
Kassin, S. M., & Wrightsman, L. S. (1981). Coerced confessions, judicial instruction, and 
mock juror verdicts. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 11(6), 489-506. 
doi:10.1111/j.1559-1816.1981.tb00838.x 
Kassin, S. M., & Wrightsman, L. S. (1983). The construction and validation of a juror bias 
scale. Journal of Research in Personality, 17(4), 423-442. 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/0092-6566(83)90070-3 
Kassin, S. M., & Wrightsman, L. S. (1985). Confession evidence The Psychology of 
Evidence and Trial Procedure (pp. 67-94). Beverly Hills: Sage Publications. 
Kelley, H. H. (1973). The process of causal attribution. American Psychologist, 107-128.  
Lassiter, D. G., Munhall, G. D., Berger, I. P., Weiland, P. E., Handley, I. M., & Geers, A. L. 
(2005). Attributional complexity and the camera perspective bias in videotaped 
confessions. Basic adn Applied Social Psychology, 27(1), 27-35. 
doi:10.1207/s15324834basp2701_3 
Lassiter, D. G., Slaw, D. R., Briggs, M. A., & Scanlan, C. R. (1992). The Potential for Bias 
in Videotaped Confessions1. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 22(23), 1838-
1851. doi:10.1111/j.1559-1816.1992.tb00980.x 
Leippe, M. R. (2016). Reasonable doubt definition effects on judged guilt: Moderation by 
need for cognition and mediation by changes in required and felt certainty. Journal 
of Applied Social Psychology, 46, 302-312. doi:10.1111/jasp.12365 
Leippe, M. R., Eisenstadt, D., Rauch, S. M., & Seib, H. M. (2004). Timing of eyewitness 
expert testimony, jurors' Need for Cognition, and case strength as determinants of 
trial verdicts. Journal of Applied Psychology, 89(3), 524-541. doi:10.1037/0021-
9010.89.3.524 
Leo, R. A. (1996). Insite the interrogation room. The Journal of Criminal Law and 
Criminology, 86, 266-303.  
Leo, R. A. (2008). Police Interrogation and American Justice. New York: Harvard 
University Press. 
Leo, R. A., & Drizin, S. A. (2010). The three errors: Pathways to false confession and 
wrongful conviction. In G. D. Lassiter & C. Meissner (Eds.), Police Interrogations 
and False Confessions: Current Research, Practice, and Policy Recommendations 
(pp. 9-32). Washington D.C.: American Psychological Association. 
Leo, R. A., & Liu, B. (2009). What do potential jurors know about police interrogation 
techniques and false confessions? Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 27(381-399). 
doi:10.1002/bsl.872 
Leo, R. A., & Ofshe, R. J. (1998). The consequences of false confessions: Deprivations of 
liberty and miscarriages of justice in the age of psychological interrogation. The 
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 88(2), 429-496. doi:10.2307/1144288 
Malloy, C., & Lamb, M. E. (2010). Biases in judging victims and suspects whose statements 
are inconsistent. Law and Human Behavior, 34, 46-48. doi:10.1007/s10979-009-
9211-y 
Neuschatz, J. S., Lawson, D. S., Swanner, J. K., Meissner, C. A., & Neuschatz, J. S. (2008). 
The effects of accomplice witness and jailhouse informants on jury decision making. 
Law and Human Behavior, 32(2), 137-149. doi:10.1007/s10979-007-9100-1 
Ofshe, R. J., & Leo, R. A. (1997). The social psychology of police interrogation: The theory 
and classification of true and false confessions. Studies in Law, Politics and Society, 
16, 189-251.  
Palmer, M. A., Button, L., Barnett, E., & Brewer, N. (2016). Inconsistencies undermine the 
credibility of confession evidence. Legal and Criminological Psychology, 21(1), 
161-173. doi:10.1111/lcrp.12048 
134 
  
Pennington, N., & Hastie, R. (1986). Evidence evaluation in complex decision making. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51(2), 242-258. doi:10.1037/0022-
3514.51.2.242 
Pennington, N., & Hastie, R. (1992). Explaining the Evidence - Tests of the Story Model for 
Juror Decision-Making. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 62(2), 189-
206. doi:10.1037//0022-3514.62.2.189 
Redlich, A. D., Ghetti, S., & Quas, J. A. (2008). Perceptions of children during a police 
interview: A comparison of alleged victims and suspects. Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 38(3), 705-735. doi:10.1111/j.1559-1816.2007.00323.x 
Reid, J. E., & Inbau, F. (2011). Distinguishing between true and false confessions. Criminal 
Interrogations and Confessions (5th ed., pp. 411-447): Jones and Bartlett Publishers. 
Ross, L. (1977). The intuitive psychologist and his shortcomings: Distortions in the 
attribution process. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 10, 173-220. 
doi:10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60357-3 
Russano, M. B., Meissner, C. A., Narchet, F. M., & Kassin, S. M. (2005). Investigating true 
and false confessions within a novel experimental paradigm. Psychological Science, 
16(6), 481-486. doi:10.1111/j.0956-7976.2005.01560.x 
Sauer, J. D., Palmer, M. A., & Brewer, N. (2017). Mock-juror evaluations of traditional and 
ratings-based eyewitness identification evidence. Law and Human Behavior, 41(375-
384). doi:10.1037/lhb0000235 
Shestowsky, D., & Horowitz, L. M. (2004). How the Need for Cognition sclae predicts 
behavior in mock jury deliberations. Law and Human Behavior, 28(3), 305-337.  
Sommers, S. R., & Kassin, S. M. (2001). On the many impacts of inadmissable testimony: 
Selective compliance, Need for Cognition, and the overcorrection bias. Personality 
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 27(10), 1368-1377.  
Tenney, E. R., MacCoun, R. J., Spellman, B. A., & Hastie, R. (2007). Calibration trumps 
confidence as a basis for witness credibility. Psychological Science, 18(1), 46-50. 
doi:10.111/j.1467-9280.2007.01874.x 
Woestehoff, S. A., & Meissner, C. A. (2016). Juror sensitivity to false confession risk 
factors: Dispositional vs. situational attributions for a confession. Law and Human 
Behavior, 40, 564-579. doi:10.1037/lhb0000201 
Woody, W. D., Forrest, K. D., & Yendra, S. (2014). Comparing the effects of explicit and 
implicit false-evidence ploys on mock jurors' verdicts, sentencing recommendations, 
and perceptions of police interrogation. Psychology, Crime & Law, 20(6), 603-617. 
doi:10.1080/1068316X.2013.804922 
Wright Whelan, C., Wagstaff, G. F., & Wheatcroft, J. M. (2015). High stakes lies: Police 
and non-police accuracy in detecting deception. Psychology, Crime & Law, 21(2), 
127-138. doi:10.1080/1068316X.2014.935777 
Wrightsman, L. S., & Engelbrecht, S. (2004). Confession Attitudes Scale. In L. S. 
Wrightsman, A. L. Batson, & V. A. Edkins (Eds.), Measures of legal attitudes (pp. 
57-59). California, U.S.A.: Thomson/Wadsworth. 
 
Appendix A  135 
  
 
 
Appendix A – Information sheets and consent forms 
  
Appendix A  136 
  
Appendix A  137 
  
Appendix A  138 
  
Appendix A  139 
  
 
 
 
